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Explain to them – it [was] not our will to be there and the bad things that we did [were]
even not our will… You just tell them, so that they know.
-Former LRA Member, Female, Age 25
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Abstract
In the wake of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) conflict in Northern Uganda,
both the local and international community struggle to define the “victims” and
“perpetrators” of a conflict that transformed ordinary civilians into combatants. Made up
primarily of child soldiers, the LRA forcefully abducted and conscripted children across
Northern Uganda to fight in a guerilla war against the Ugandan government. LRA
members were forced to murder their own families and terrorize their home villages in an
attempt to disorient and desensitize them to lives of violence. Some became willing, even
eager fighters; others struggled daily to live with their actions.
Nearly ten years after the guns went silent in Northern Uganda, various methods
of transitional justice have been employed to resolve the ambiguity of victims and
perpetrators. Most recently, the International Criminal Court indicted Dominic Ongwen,
a high-ranking LRA commander abducted at the age of ten. As the date of his trial nears,
debates over his victimhood and perpetrator-hood intensify. The stakes of the trial are
high both for the affected communities promised reparations and for the future of child
soldiers in international law; Dominic Ongwen is the first person to be tried for a war
crime of which he is also a victim.
This research examines the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former
LRA members and how this complexity is constructed by members themselves, local
communities, and the ICC. Data was collected over the period of four weeks from
November to December 2016 in Gulu district and Kampala through case studies with
former LRA members, focus group discussions, and interviews with local opinion
leaders. This research concluded the following: (1) former LRA members exhibit
overlapping factors of victimhood and perpetrator-hood, and thus cannot be categorized
as solely victims or solely perpetrators; (2) most former LRA members construct
themselves as victims when faced with the risk of punishment, but in risk-free
environments recognize their complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood; (3) most local
community members recognize the complexity of former LRA members, but their
constructions are influenced by self-interest; and, (4) the ICC struggles to recognize the
complexity of Dominic Ongwen’s victimhood and perpetrator-hood, instead constructing
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him as a perpetrator to legitimize its method of retributive justice. This paper concludes
with recommendations to the International Criminal Court, the Government of Uganda,
local opinion leaders, and future researchers based on findings.
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Definitions

Victim: In this work, a “victim” is defined as someone who helplessly suffers a
wrongdoing.
Perpetrator: In this work, a “perpetrator” is defined as someone who willfully commits a
wrongdoing.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
On August 20th, 1989, twenty-one-year-old Lyle Menéndez and his eighteen-yearold brother Erik shot their wealthy parents, Jose and Kitty, while they were watching
television in their living room.
When faced with seemingly incomprehensible atrocities, it is comforting to sort
actors into the neat boxes of “evil perpetrator” and “innocent victim.” In doing so, we
transform perpetrators into monsters, people so far removed from ourselves that we could
never imagine committing the same atrocities (Mohamed, 2015, p. 1211). We breathe a
sigh of relief, knowing we could never relate to the likes of the Menéndez brothers.
But the boxes of “victim” and “perpetrator” only tell part of the story. They fail to
recognize the crippling control exerted over the Menéndez brothers by their overbearing
father, and even allegations of mental and sexual abuse (Noble, 1996). They skirt
contextual clues that might make the Menéndez brothers’ actions fathomable, and
perhaps even sympathetic.
In Luo, the language of the Acholi of Northern Uganda, there are no words for
“victim” or “perpetrator.” Instead, the Acholi refer to lakomakec, or the unfortunate ones.
Indeed, many were unfortunate in Northern Uganda. In the wake of the three-decade-long
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) conflict that transformed the community’s children into
killers through abduction and forceful conscription, Northern Ugandans are working
simultaneously to forgive and achieve justice for actors in the conflict.
Amid debates over the “right” method of justice for Northern Uganda, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) issued five arrest warrants for LRA leaders in 2005.
As of 2016, the only warrant successfully executed was that for Dominic Ongwen, a rebel
leader who himself was abducted as a child. In 2015, Ongwen was taken into the ICC’s
custody; his trial will begin in December of 2016 (“The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen,”
2016).
The complexity of Dominic Ongwen’s status as both a victim of abduction and a
perpetrator of atrocity has brought to the fore debates over the constructs of “victim” and
“perpetrator” in international justice. As the first known person to be tried for “a war
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crime of which he is also a victim,” Ongwen’s case will test how the ICC handles those
with ambiguous victim/perpetrator status (Baines, 2009, p. 163-164).
Through case studies of former LRA members, this research aims to lay bare the
complex backgrounds and motivations of former LRA members such as Ongwen,
questioning the applicability of a victim/perpetrator dichotomy. Further, it seeks to
understand how LRA members’ complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood is constructed
by members themselves, the local community, and the International Criminal Court in the
face of Ongwen’s impending trial.
As Christopher Browning emphasized of Holocaust perpetrators in his book
Ordinary Men, “Explaining is not excusing, understanding is not forgiving” (as cited in
Govier & Verwoerd, 2004, p. 375). The purpose of this paper is not to exonerate former
LRA members. It is only to offer a deeper, more nuanced understanding of their complex
roles in the conflict in Northern Uganda. In doing so, this research attempts to combat
polarized narratives of victims and perpetrators, instead advocating for the recognition of
the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of actors in conflict.
1.2 Background to the Conflict in Northern Uganda
1.2.1 History of the LRA Conflict
Seeds of conflict were planted in Uganda as early as the colonial era when British
administrators assigned cheap labor, security, and defense to Northern Ugandans;
meanwhile the central region gained control over the country’s economic and political
development (Happold, 2007, p. 162). Since then, a lack of national reintegration has
fueled lingering regional and ethnic tensions. Post-independence Uganda endured
fourteen different insurgencies, transitioning rapidly through leaders who each favored
different regions of the divided country (Di Giovanni, 2005, p. 31). Milton Obote rose to
post-independence power mostly due to chance; unable to build a strong base of support
within his own party, he adopted a “divide and rule” policy that cleaved the country along
religious lines and dissolved democratic checks and balances to favor Obote’s own party
(Uzoigwe, 1983, p. 262-263). His support gradually deteriorated, and General Idi Amin
overthrew Obote in 1971, ending parliamentary government in Uganda (Uzoigwe, 1983,
p. 265-266). Idi Amin retaliated against those who had supported Obote, executing
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thousands of Acholi, Langi, and other elites and founding his regime on terror and
oppression (Brett, 1995, p. 138-139). The years following Amin’s regime were marked
by rapid transitions of power that further dissolved national unity, and Obote regained
power in 1980 (Brett, 1995, p. 141). After two more coup d’états, current president
Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army overthrew General Tito Okello in 1986.
Resistance groups soon sprouted in an attempt to fight back against the oppressive regime
of Museveni (Happold, 2007, p. 162).
Alice Lakwena emerged as a powerful spiritual rebel in Acholiland, establishing
the Holy Spirit Movement in 1986, which “sought to energize the northern Acholi society
and restore the imbalance and disorder caused by all of the violence they faced”
(Happold, 2007, p. 162; as cited in Di Giovanni, 2005, p. 33). After an attempted
takeover of Kampala, Lakwena’s movement was defeated. The Uganda People’s
Democratic Army, another major rebel group, surrendered to the Ugandan Government
during the Pece Peace Accords of 1988 (Happold, 2007, p. 162).
What few rebels remained united as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) under the
leadership of Joseph Kony, a spiritual medium who claimed relation to Lakwena
(Happold, 2007, p. 163). Although Kony’s political motivations were ambiguous (Di
Giovanni, 2005, p. 33), he declared the ultimate goal of overthrowing Museveni and
establishing a government based on the Ten Commandments (Traylor, 2009, p. 25).
Kony’s guerilla war against the Ugandan Government was concentrated mainly in the
north. Instead of fighting the Ugandan Government, however, the LRA largely terrorized
civilians, resulting in thousands of innocent deaths and widespread fear of the LRA
among Northern Ugandans (as cited in Happold, 2007, p. 163).
1.2.2 Conscription and Retention in the LRA
Throughout its existence, the LRA remained dependent on abduction to sustain
itself (“The Dust Has Not Yet Settled,” 2011, p. 44). In a 2008 survey of war-affected
youth, more than one-third of male youth and one-fifth of female youth in Northern
Uganda reported abduction by the LRA (as cited in “The Dust Has Not Yet Settled,”
2011, 42); as of 2015, over 60,000 children had been forcefully abducted and conscripted
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into the LRA (Odong, 2015, p. 3). In the case of women, such abductions often included
sexual enslavement (“Victims, Perpetrators, or Heroes?” 2006, p. 12).
After abduction, new LRA members endured gruesome initiation rituals that
included beatings, long marches, and being forced to kill relatives; others were made to
taste or roll in blood, or eat while sitting on dead bodies (Baines, 2009, p. 170). These
rituals were designed to disorient and brainwash new abductees into obedience (Schauer
& Elbert, 2010, p. 321-322). One former LRA reported being in a “confused state” for a
week after being forced to cut his sister (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 330).
The LRA’s command structure was “based on fear” (“Victims, Perpetrators, or
Heroes?” 2006, p. 12), and its leadership discouraged youths’ vulnerability through
violent punishment (Boothby, 2006, p. 248). One former LRA member reported, “If you
show how you feel, you will be killed” (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 321). Many LRA
members were convinced that Joseph Kony could read minds due to the LRA’s “spiritual
indoctrination,” which contributed to widespread fear and obedience (Baines, 2009, p.
170). In addition, the LRA employed political indoctrination, spreading false rumors
among its members that the government was trying to kill off the Acholi people (Baines,
2008, p. 9). Commanders convinced LRA members that once the LRA overthrew
Museveni, members would be given important positions in the new government (Baines,
2009, p. 171). Thus, LRA members sought promotions both as a way to protect their
personal security and ensure success in the future.
1.2.3 Dominic Ongwen
Dominic Ongwen’s circumstances mirrored those of many LRA members
(Baines, 2009, p. 164). Abducted at age ten while on his way to school, Ongwen was
forcefully conscripted into the LRA. Young and impressionable, he became “efficient”
and “fearlessly loyal” to his superiors, eventually rising to the rank of commander. Those
who knew him told mixed stories about his victimhood and perpetrator-hood during his
time in the LRA. Some remembered Ongwen releasing people from captivity “at
considerable risk to himself.” Others, however, recalled Ongwen killing pregnant women
and boiling people in pots (Baines, 2009, p. 172-173). Like many other LRA members,
Ongwen’s seemingly contradictory actions reveal a complex character, one whose
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motivations were a “product of the context he lived in” (Baines, 2008, p. 10). Yet unlike
many other LRA members, Ongwen was obedient and skilled enough to be promoted to
the “inner circle” of the LRA (Baines, 2009, p. 164).
1.2.4 ICC Intervention
Ongwen’s unique position became evident to the International Criminal Court,
which began its investigation of the “situation concerning the LRA” in 2004 after a
referral by President Museveni. In 2005, after the completion of its investigation, the ICC
issued arrest warrants for what it determined to be the top five LRA commanders: Joseph
Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen (Happold,
2007, p. 159-161).
The ICC’s intervention sparked much controversy in Northern Uganda. Many
were afraid that the arrest warrants would discourage LRA members from surrendering
under Uganda’s Amnesty Act, prolonging the conflict. Others accused President
Museveni of manipulating the ICC by only referring “the situation concerning the LRA,”
shielding his own forces from investigation into the atrocities they committed on the
other side of the conflict (Happold, 2007, p. 161). More broadly, many Northern
Ugandans condemned the ICC for its brand of retributive justice; they favored traditional
justice mechanisms that promoted forgiveness and reconciliation over punishment
(Baguma, 2012).
Nevertheless, the ICC pushed on; after ten long years, Dominic Ongwen was
arrested and brought into ICC custody. His charges were confirmed in early 2016, and his
case is set to begin in December of 2016 (“The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen,” 2016).
Ongwen is first known person to be charged in international law with “a war crime of
which he is also a victim” (Baines, 2009, p. 163-164).
1.3 Problem Statement
The existence of a false victim/perpetrator dichotomy polarizes those with
ambiguous victim/perpetrator status (McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012, p. 532; Mazinani,
2014, p. 289); in Northern Uganda, this dichotomy manifests in the polarization of former
LRA members. The local and international community place former LRA members into
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boxes of “helpless abductee” or “evil criminal”; both characterizations fail to recognize
the complex context and motivations of former LRA members. Limited research has
examined the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former LRA members; to the
author’s knowledge, no studies have utilized case study research to illuminate the
difficult choices faced by LRA members during war. This study thus offers critical
insight into both the study of former LRA members as well as broader scholarship on
victims and perpetrators.
Various parties to the conflict construct the complex victimhood and perpetratorhood of former LRA members based on their own self-interest (Govier & Verwoerd,
2004, p. 372). Much literature exists on the social construction of “victims” and
“perpetrators,” yet this literature only briefly touches on the motivations behind such
social construction. By laying bare the incentives for the social construction of “victims”
and “perpetrators,” this study attempts to combat simplistic constructions in favor of
nuanced understanding.
1.4 Statement of Objectives
This study seeks to:
1. Understand the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former LRA
members through in-depth case studies;
2. Conceptualize former LRA members’ constructions of their own victimhood and
perpetrator-hood;
3. Conceptualize local community members’ constructions of the victimhood and
perpetrator-hood of former LRA members; and
4. Conceptualize the ICC’s constructions of the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
former LRA members.
1.5 Significance of the Study
The impending Dominic Ongwen trial at the ICC will be the first time that a
person is tried in international law for “war crimes of which he is also a victim” (Baines,
2009, p. 163-164). In the lead-up to this historic trial, it is essential to fully understand the
complexity of former LRA members such as Dominic Ongwen. Beyond the trial,
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understanding these complexities is essential to identifying key contextual factors that
motivate or force those with complex victim/perpetrator status to commit atrocity. By
identifying these key contextual factors, this research moves one step closer to preventing
similar conflict-inciting contexts in the future.

VICTIMHOOD AND PERPETRATOR-HOOD IN N. UGANDA

8

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
In retrospective examinations of conflict, a clear line is drawn between victims
and perpetrators. Post-conflict experts promote healing for victims and punishment and
rehabilitation for perpetrators. But in the face of new war tactics, such as the use of child
soldiers, how does one determine who deserves pity and who deserves punishment? As
the nature of conflict evolves, so too does our understanding of victims, perpetrators, and
those who do not fit perfectly into either category. The following section reviews existing
literature on the categories of victim and perpetrator, and how to deal with the
complications that arise when attempting to apply these categories in the context of new
wars.
2.1 The Victim/Perpetrator Dichotomy
Since its origin from the Latin word “victima,” meaning “a person or animal
killed as a sacrifice” (“Victim,” n.d.), the word “victim” has come to embody innocence
and helplessness. Its “juxtapos[ition] with the wickedness of a perpetrator” in Western
culture through narratives of conflict and retributive justice has created a stark
victim/perpetrator dichotomy in which all sufferers are powerless and all wrongdoers are
inherently evil (McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012, p. 532; Mazinani, 2014, p. 289). Even
among international relations scholars, categories of victim and perpetrator are taken for
granted, constants upon which conflict analysis is based (as cited in Jacoby, 2015, p.
512).
As scholars probe the context of conflict more deeply, many conclude that the
ideas of “victim” and “perpetrator” are socially constructed and fail to reflect the true
nature of actors in conflict. In what they refer to as the “fallacy of a false dichotomy,”
Govier and Verwoerd explain that, “People often tend to focus on the contrastive ends of
that spectrum… seeking to divide reality into two distinct chunks.” However, the
dichotomy of victims and perpetrators is not “exhaustive” or “exclusive,” because some
actors may occupy both categories, or neither (Govier & Verwoerd, 2004, p. 372).
Characterizing a person as either a victim or a perpetrator overemphasizes a single facet
of the person’s experience at the expense of contextual complexities (Govier &
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Verwoerd, 2004, p. 371). Drumbl (2016) cites the example of the Holocaust, where some
victimized Jews conspired to help their Nazi persecutors in order to protect themselves or
make money (p. 3). In another example, Tyler and Beal cite homeless populations, who
often exist both as victims of economic deprivation and, in response, perpetrators of petty
crime (as cited in McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012, p. 531). Clearly, actors in conflict
cannot always be put into neat boxes.
In her study of narratives of rape, Brenner (2014) condemns the victim/perpetrator
dichotomy, which assumes perpetrator “agency” and victim “passivity” while “fail[ing]
to acknowledge that…multiple subjective truths might be possible.” She found that the
victim/perpetrator dichotomy inhibited college students’ understandings of complex
situations of acquaintance rape and “nonconsensual, unwanted, or confusing” sex (p. 503504).
Analyzing actors only through the lenses of victim and perpetrator “limits the
imagination,” inhibiting a nuanced understanding of complex conflicts. According to
Govier and Verwoerd, “to regard ex-combatants as irredeemably evil is to disregard their
humanity” (Govier & Verwoerd, 2004, p. 372, 375-376). Mohamed’s study of the trauma
criminals often endure during and after their crimes “erodes the all-too-common
perception of perpetrators as cartoonish monsters by exposing their ordinariness and
humanity” (Mohamed, 2015, p. 1157). Examining the complexity of such perpetrators –
and recognizing that they may simultaneously be victims – allows for a more realistic and
grounded understanding of complex conflicts.
2.2 Self-Interested Social Construction of Victims and Perpetrators
If the categories of victim and perpetrator are oversimplified, why do they exist?
As Brenner (2014) found in her study of rape narratives, “there is a tangible political
benefit to formulating the issue of rape in such dichotomous terms. Beyond the
theoretical clarity of it, the victim/perpetrator framework offers a clear picture of who
deserves our sympathy” (p. 517). Constructing falsely clean-cut “victims” and
“perpetrators” allows various actors to make sense of atrocity and manipulate it to serve
their own interests.
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Titeca and Costeur (2015) analyzed how different major political actors framed
the LRA, and found that varied framings of the LRA were informed by geopolitical and
strategic interests. The following literature explores micro-level framings of LRA
members; these micro-level framings are equally influenced by micro-strategic interests.
2.2.1 The Interests of Primary Actors
Often, the primary actors in a conflict construct narratives of their own
victimhood to “explain, justify, and legitimize their political behavior” (as cited in Pilecki
& Hammack, 2014, p. 813). Narratives of victimhood increase one’s relative power by
creating a “moral debt” and eliciting sympathy for questionable actions (Pilecki &
Hammack, 2014, p. 823). The accuracy of these narratives is often uncertain, however,
since “both victims and perpetrators have self-serving motives that result in the
distortions of transgression events” (Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997, p. 1158; Kearns &
Finchman, 2005, p. 321). Those accused of crimes tend may emphasize aspects of their
victimhood (Jacoby, 2015, p. 515), advancing “self-serving distortions” to protect their
sense of self-worth (Kearns & Finchman, 2005, p. 321). Or, they may choose to
emphasize their heroism; due to the stigmatization of victims in post-conflict Northern
Uganda, former LRA members often portray themselves as heroic survivors (“Victims,
Perpetrators, or Heroes?” 2006, p. 14).
In a study conducted by Stillwell and Baumeister, participants were asked to
identify with either a victim or perpetrator and retell a story of a situation in their own
words (Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997, p. 1157). Both groups “edited” stories to serve their
own interests, consciously or unconsciously (Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997, p. 1168),
reaffirming that the social construction of victims and perpetrators is self-serving.
2.2.2 The Interests of Local Communities
Local communities also have stake in the social construction of victims and
perpetrators. In a survey conducted in 2005 when the LRA conflict was ongoing, 31% of
respondents said their most immediate need was peace; 0% said their immediate need
was justice (“Forgotten Voices,” 2005, p. 25). This coincided with the popular perception
of LRA members – even those of the ranks of Dominic Ongwen – as victims (Baines,
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2008, p. 10). Constructing LRA members as victims, and thus allowing them legal
amnesty and encouraging them to surrender, was one step closer to peace for frustrated
and exhausted local communities (Agger, 2012, p. 1).
With the silence of the guns, local views of LRA members as victims evolved.
Interviews with community members in Lukodi, one of the areas affected by Dominic
Ongwen’s atrocities, reflected perceptions of Ongwen as a perpetrator and a desire for his
conviction at the ICC. These views were likely influenced by the promise of reparations
if Ongwen is convicted (Nyeko & Aloyocan, 2015, p. 5). On the contrary, community
members in Coorom, Ongwen’s hometown, viewed Ongwen as a victim of circumstance,
and emphasized consideration of his victimhood in the ICC case (Nyeko & Aloyocan,
2015, p. 2). Varying interests in the ICC case thus correlated with various constructions
of the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of LRA members in the case of
Dominic Ongwen.
2.2.3 The Interests of Justice Mechanisms
Mohamed (2015) credits the social construction of “victims” and “perpetrators” as
“collateral damage of accountability” (p. 1214). In the race to achieve accountability for
crimes, justice mechanisms do not always recognize the complex backgrounds of actors
in conflict, instead constructing them as either entirely perpetrators or entirely victims
(Baines, 2009, p. 183; Fletcher, 2016, p. 302). This polarization legitimizes various
justice mechanisms by necessitating punishment for constructed perpetrators and justice
for constructed victims (Fletcher, 2016, p. 302).
Rwanda, a neighbor of Uganda, provides an example of the polarization of
victims and perpetrators to serve the interests of justice mechanisms. In the wake of the
Rwandan genocide, local gacaca courts were created by the Rwandan government to try
perpetrators. Despite the appearance of gacaca as a fair and unbiased assessment of
crimes, according to Begley, “the lasting legacy of gacaca is the collective
criminalization of all Hutu” due in part to its “restricted mandate to only try genocide
crimes.” This mandate ignored crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front against
Hutus, instead only focusing on the crimes of Hutu genocidaires (Begley, 2016, p. 4-5).
While Hutus perpetrated the majority of crimes in Rwanda, polarizing their status ignored
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the complexities of the Rwandan genocide in favor of legitimizing gacaca as a method of
justice. Some even condemned gacaca as “victors’ justice,” promoted by the Tutsi
government to maintain its newfound power over the majority Hutu population postgenocide (Tiemessen, 2004). By polarizing the perpetrator status of Hutus, gacaca and
the Tutsi government are, according to Hutu participants in Begley’s study, “corrupting
the institution for their own benefit” (Begley, 2016, p. 16).
Some scholars believe that the ICC similarly constructs “victims” and
“perpetrators” to its own benefit. In her theory of the “imagined victim,” Fletcher (2016)
explains that international criminal justice mechanisms construct victims as pure sufferers
deserving of justice, consequently necessitating punishment for perpetrators (p. 302). In
the face of recent withdrawals by African states, the ICC is facing a crisis of credibility
and must take steps to improve its status in the public eye (Black, 2016, para. 5). One
such step could be the construction of pure victims and evil perpetrators to legitimize the
ICC’s form of justice – this time in the case of Dominic Ongwen.
2.3 The Complexity of Victims and Perpetrators in New Wars
Modern conflicts often blur the line between victim and perpetrator (Jacoby,
2015, p. 511). Characterized by the use of mass atrocities, semi-automatic weapons, and
“irregular forces,” these “new wars” often target civilians both as the enemy and as
recruitment pools for child soldiers (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 312-313). As of 2015,
approximately 250,000 children were “involved” with armed groups globally (Derluyn,
Vandenhole, Parmentier & Mels, 2015, p. 1). As unwilling children are forced into
combat, “the categories ‘civilian’ and ‘combatant’ become fused” (Boyden, 2003, p.
344). Soldiers, who would generally be constructed as “perpetrators,” are prevented from
making moral choices due to their forceful conscription; they are “coerced moral agents”
(as cited in Vaha, 2008, p. 6).
2.3.1 The Phenomenon of Child Soldiers
Child soldiers have existed throughout history, but discussion around child
soldiers has come to the forefront with their recent prevalence in new wars. The 2007
Paris Principles define a child soldier as:
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Any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children,
boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual
purposes.
(As cited in Derluyn, Vandenhole, Parmentier & Mels, 2015, p. 1).
According to Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, children
must be fifteen before they can be legally recruited for armed conflict. International
humanitarian law and criminal law use this same standard. The Optional Protocol on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) says that children must be 18 before
they can be recruited for armed conflict, excluding volunteers for state forces. The
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is unique in its use of a “straight
18 approach” (as cited in Derluyn, Vandenhole, Parmentier & Mels, 2015, p. 3).
Regardless of the legal age of recruitment, the vast majority of child soldiers are young
enough that their recruitment is considered illegal and a violation of their human rights.
With the recent increase in dialogue surrounding child soldiers and children’s
rights, much debate has arisen around the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
child soldiers. Child development psychologists assert that when children become
soldiers, they are not yet fully morally developed; as a result, many consider these
children victims of indoctrination and brainwashing (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 311).
Conversely, child soldiers often commit atrocities such as torture, rape, and murder. The
brutal nature of these atrocities – and the view that child soldiers often commit these acts
willingly – leads others to see child soldiers as perpetrators, and thus accountable under
international law (Leveau, 2013, p. 37). Trials such as that of Dominic Ongwen bring the
legal responsibility of child soldiers into the limelight; their moral responsibility however
is another question. Thus, the debate over the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood
of child soldiers rages. The following sections explore arguments for child soldiers as
victims, perpetrators, or both.
2.3.2 Child Soldiers as Victims
The baseline argument for the victimhood of child soldiers stems from society’s
failure to protect them from conscription. Unlike adults, who possess both rights and
responsibilities in society, children are owed rights and protection by society, yet do not
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bear the responsibility that accompanies these rights (as cited in Vaha, 2008, p. 13). Thus,
if children are not granted the fundamental right of protection by society, many argue
they are not responsible for the crimes they commit when they become child soldiers.
Arguments for the victimhood of child soldiers extend to the psychological realm,
as well. Studies of child development offer contradicting views on the development of
morals and a sense of right and wrong, but most findings suggest a comparative lack of
moral reasoning in children compared to adults. Child psychologist Piaget argues that
children remain irrational throughout much of their childhood, suggesting the delay of
their moral development (as cited in Boyden, 2003, p. 350). Other disciplines such as
cultural anthropology argue that a child’s moral development hinges on the presence of a
“moral community”; without such a community (as in war), a child’s moral compass will
not fully develop (Boyden, 2003, p. 352).
When a child is surrounded by war, developmental disorientation can occur,
halting moral development and obscuring empathy and personal beliefs and behaviors (as
cited in Boyden, 2003, p. 352). Due to the constant stress of a war environment, the
brains of child soldiers are prone to developing along stress-responsive pathways.
Conditioned to survive in intense conditions, child soldiers often exhibit rapid transitions
to anger, aggression, or flight in response to any sort of threat (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p.
332). Child soldiers may also cope by dissociating from the reality of trauma, distancing
themselves from the repercussions of their actions (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 334).
Some child soldiers stated how violence became “normal” and even “arousing” as they
acclimated to their environment (as cited in Hermenau, Hecker, Maedl, Schauer, and
Elbert, 2013, p. 2). Further, military leaders can often replace the parental figure in a
child’s life, and children are more readily to trust these leaders without thinking of the
consequences of their actions (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 319). Bruce Auster accused
war of “deform[ing]” children’s sense of right and wrong, “turning 12-year-olds into
cold-blooded killers.” According to Punamäki, if the “behavior of the whole society is
based on ... the denial of human values,” as it is often in war, “then moral development
ultimately ceases” (as cited in Boyden, 2003, p. 353). Thus, he argues, child soldiers are
victims of circumstance.
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Psychological trauma aside, child soldiers face tangible threats that influence
them to act in ways they otherwise would not. Brutal initiation processes make child
soldiers fear punishment if they attempt to escape (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 319).
According to Baines (2009), “children may ‘play stupid’ to avoid being forced to kill, or
‘play smart’ – include demonstrating a willingness to kill – in order to secure a better life,
such as access to better food or security” (p. 179). McEvoy and McConnachie (2012)
propose the idea of a victim “who is no longer chained to characteristics of complete
innocence and purity, but remains a victim nonetheless” (p. 534-535). The seemingly
incomprehensible actions of child soldiers often stem from the need for survival; many
view them thus as victims of circumstance.
2.3.3 Child Soldiers as Perpetrators
Vaha (2008) argues that the notion of child soldiers as victims is fundamentally
dependent on the idea that children are “the weakest members of society and thus entitled
for special protection” (p. 13). Even if they are not legally responsible before age 18, she
argues, children are morally responsible (Vaha, 2008, p. 18). Brocklehurst concurs,
articulating that focusing on child soldiers as only victims strips them of their agency as
moral and political beings (as cited in Vaha, 2008, p. 18). Sometimes, child soldiers
choose to willfully “suppress their morality in order to survive or gain a sense of power
and control over their lives” (Baines, 2009, p. 178). Some former child soldiers recall
going on “autopilot” or “outside of their bodies” when forced to kill; others recall
committing atrocities because they were curious if it would “appease spirits,” as they
were told by their commanders (Baines, 2008, p. 15). Nevertheless, according to
Brocklehurst and Vaha, these child soldiers remain morally conscious beings with the full
understanding that their actions are wrong.
Boyden questions the psychological argument that war warps children’s
development. Citing studies that show the moral resiliency of former child soldiers, she
points out that if child soldiers can remain morally resilient, their moral development has
clearly not been hindered by war (Boyden, 2003, p. 359). In her and others’ view, child
soldiers are perpetrators responsible for their actions by virtue of their moral
comprehension.
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2.3.4 The Complex Reality of Child Soldiers
According to Derluyn et al. (2015), “only by moving beyond the binary
distinction between victim- and perpetrator-hood, the complexity of child soldiering can
be grasped” (p. 1). Rather than constructing child soldiers as solely victims or solely
perpetrators – which McEvoy and McConnachie argue is “reductionist” – many scholars
argue that child soldiers fall into both categories (McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012, p. 533;
Hermenau, Hecker, Maedl, Schauer & Elbert, 2013, p. 2). In fact, a study of former child
solders in the Democratic Republic of Congo revealed that child soldiers perceived
themselves as both victims and perpetrators (Hermenau, Hecker, Maedl, Schauer &
Elbert, 2013, p. 6).
Perhaps the victimhood or perpetrator-hood of child soldiers is determined by
their time in and dedication to an army. Of a sample of child soldiers abducted into
Mozambique’s rebel group Renamo, all child soldiers who had been in the rebel group
for less than six months referred to themselves as “victims” rather than “members” of the
rebel group, whereas those who had spent more than a year with the rebel group tended to
identify more with the group itself. The second group of children expressed pride in their
ranks and power in the rebel group (Boothby, 2006, p. 249-250).
Howana critiques the idea of a chronological progression of child soldiers from
victims to perpetrators:
We might say that, having started out as victims, many of them were converted
into perpetrators of the most violent and atrocious deeds. Yet such a linear
progress does not fully represent the complex, intertwined, and mutually
reinforcing acts of violence of which they were both victim and perpetrators.
Some boy soldiers were most victimized in the very act of murdering others...
their identification with those they mercilessly killed was not redemptive; rather,
it wed them more irrevocably to the identity of soldier.
(As cited in Baines, 2008, p. 16)
McMahan offers a similarly nuanced view. He suggests that we understand child
soldiers “as people who have a diminished capacity for morally responsible agency and
who act in conditions that further diminish their personal responsibility for their actions
in war” (as cited in Baines, 2008, p. 16). Due to both their limited developmental stage
and their violent surroundings, he views child soldiers as neither solely victims nor solely
perpetrators; their victimhood and perpetrator-hood is complex and context-dependent.
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In “Reflections on Dominic Ongwen,” Baines introduces the concept of a
“complex political perpetrator” to describe Ongwen and others in his situation, victims of
circumstance whom “adapt to violence not just to survive, but to thrive” (Baines, 2009, p.
180). These complex political perpetrators may have been forcefully abducted as
children, yet remained in the LRA ranks and gained agency, as in the case of Dominic
Ongwen. According to Baines, such actors must be held accountable. However, in the
pursuit of justice, their dual victimhood and perpetrator-hood must be recognized and
actively addressed (Baines, 2009, p. 180-181).
2.4 Transitional Justice in the Context of New Wars
A Sierra Leonian religious leader explained the “chameleonic nature” of new
wars, in which overlapping victims and perpetrators share responsibility (as cited in
McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 534). This shared responsibility poses a problem for
transitional justice: how can justice mechanisms recognize dual victimhood and
perpetrator-hood? (Baines, 2009, p. 164). The following sections explore the ability of
various transitional justice mechanisms to address the complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood of actors in new wars.
2.4.1 Child Soldiers in Domestic and International Law
Domestic and international law both address the issue of child soldiers either
directly or indirectly. Yet no law directly address child soldiers like Ongwen who
matured into adulthood and continued to commit crimes. The following section explores
the laws and precedents surrounding child soldiers that may influence the case of
Dominic Ongwen.
The Ugandan Constitution does not directly mention child soldiers, but it defines
children as those under the age of eighteen (“Constitution of the Republic of Uganda,”
1995, art. 257, cl. 1, §C). Additionally, regarding children under the age of sixteen, it
states:
Children are entitled to be protected from social or economic exploitation and
shall not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be
hazardous or to interfere with their education or to be harmful to their health or
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
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(“Constitution of the Republic of Uganda,” 1995, art. 34, cl. 4)
International law frequently tackles the issue of child soldiers. According to the
Rome Statute, war crimes include, “Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in
hostilities” (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, art. 8, § VII). In
2012, Thomas Lubanga was sentenced by the ICC under this article for recruiting and
conscripting child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Derluyn, Vandenhole,
Parmentier & Mels, 2015, p. 5).
Though the Rome Statute outlaws the use of child soldiers, laws surrounding the
prosecution of child soldiers are more ambiguous. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child requires that states seek, “whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing
with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings” and that any solution
promotes “the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in
society” (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, art. 40, cl. 1 and cl. 3, § B).
Similarly, the U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict emphasized that prosecution of children should be a
“measure of last resort” used to “rehabilitate and reintegrate the child into society”
(“Children and Justice,” 2011, p. 28).
There is no minimum age of criminal responsibility in international law; states
dictate this age respectively (“Children and Justice,” 2011, 35). Most domestic systems
exercise jurisdiction over those around ages 13-15 and above (Leveau, 2013, p. 42). Rule
4 of United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
or The Beijing Rules states:
In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal
responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low
an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual
maturity.
(United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, 1985, Rule 4)
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia did not establish a minimum age of criminal
responsibility, only trying those above the age of eighteen. The Special Court for Sierra
Leone had jurisdiction for those above the age of fifteen, but none were tried; instead, the
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first Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court said he would indict those responsible for the
recruitment of children (“Children and Justice,” 2011, p. 37). The Serious Crimes Panels
in East Timor had jurisdiction of those over age twelve (Leveau, 2013, p. 41). The
gacaca courts in Rwanda included a provision for “mitigating circumstances for
children” (“Children and Justice,” 2001, p. 40).
The ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by a person under the
age of eighteen (“Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 2002, art. 26); thus,
Dominic Ongwen will be tried only for crimes he committed over the age of eighteen.
His status as a child soldier will be used in mitigation only (“Dominic Ongwen at the
ICC,” 2016, p. 4).
2.4.2 Retributive Justice: Incompatible with New Wars
Retributive justice mechanisms – namely the ICC – have been condemned for
their failure to acknowledge the context of criminal acts. Despite the existence of both a
prosecution and defense designed to ensure a fair trial, retributive justice
“individualiz[es] responsibility” by singling out a suspect, thus failing to acknowledge
the broader sociopolitical context of criminal actions (Baines, 2009, p. 183).
Mawson explains the risks of retributive justice in Northern Uganda:
A narrow, punishment-oriented definition of justice is deeply problematic. It does
not take into account the political and social dynamics of the conflict or of
building peace.... It seems to ignore the pattern of abduction and use of extreme
violence within the LRA to enforce the will of commanders. It does not take into
account a fairly widely held Acholi view that their society as a whole is the
collective victim of monstrous injustice: longstanding injustice on the part of the
government and now the additional injustice of LRA terror.
(As cited in Baines, 2008, p. 17)
Deep dissatisfaction exists with the ability of retributive justice mechanisms such
as the ICC to address complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood. Many have turned to
restorative justice as an alternative, but as the following section explains, restorative
justice possesses its own drawbacks.
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2.4.3 Restorative Justice: A Flawed Alternative
Many transitional justice experts have suggested restorative justice as a way to
deal with those with ambiguous victim/perpetrator status. According to Bloch, restorative
justice allows communities to, “examine criminal acts not in isolation but within a
broader social and cultural context” (as cited in Brenner, 2014, p. 561).
In Northern Uganda specifically, advocates for traditional justice argue that it
mends broken relationships in communities (Odong, 2015, p. 10). Mato oput, a
traditional Acholi justice mechanism, has been used for LRA returnees with ambiguous
victim/perpetrator status. Mato oput involves mediation and compensation between
affected clans, incorporating long-standing and meaningful Acholi traditions (Baguma,
2012, p. 36). According to Baguma, “The fact that the alleged offenders prefer it, the
victims ask for it and the alternative [the ICC] is ill equipped to do the opposite, we could
safely conclude that to date the most suited approach in this particular case is the
traditional approach” (Baguma, 2012, p. 42).
While restorative justice mechanisms promote the recovery and reintegration of
former child soldiers, they also reinforce their status as solely victims (Musila, 2005, p.
322; Baines, 2008, p. 5). Thus, restorative justice also fails to address the complex
victimhood and perpetrator-hood of actors in conflict.
2.4.4 A Transitional Justice Dilemma
Evidently, transitional justice mechanisms have difficulty addressing the complex
victimhood and perpetrator-hood of actors in new wars. According to the Justice and
Reconciliation Project:
Both [the ICC and local justice mechanisms] reproduce the idea that victims and
perpetrators are homogenous groups, separate and distinct from one another.
Proponents of the ICC, for example, argue that those most responsible must be
punished; proponents of local approaches treat all perpetrators as an
undifferentiated collective group – they are all considered in need of forgiveness
by virtue of a shared experience (being in the bush).
(Baines, 2008, p. 5)
The polarization caused by these transitional justice mechanisms is harmful to
both local communities and ex-LRA; it may frustrate and incite former LRA members to
commit more violence (Govier & Verwoerd, 2004, p. 376). Alternatives such as truth
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commissions have been suggested to delineate complex layers of responsibility in new
wars (Baines, 2009, p. 186). Evidently, transitional justice mechanisms must be
reassessed in order to ensure post-conflict stability and justice.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Methodology
This study was conducted primarily in Gulu, a district in Northern Uganda, over a
period of four weeks in October and November of 2016. The research was cross-sectional
in design, employing case studies, formal interviews, and focus group discussions to
capture diverse understandings of the LRA conflict. Respondents were selected based on
their role in or relationship to the Northern Ugandan conflict.
As the epicenter of the LRA conflict, Gulu district offered a large sample of
actors in the conflict and a range of perspectives on the victimhood and perpetrator-hood
of former LRA members. Case studies and interviews were conducted with former LRA
members, local community members, and opinion leaders in Gulu district. Respondents
represented both the urban and rural populations of Gulu district. In addition, interviews
were conducted in Kampala to access the opinions of institutions with central roles in the
Northern Ugandan conflict.
All data collected was qualitative. Data analysis was conducted through
systematic scrutiny and evaluation of interview and focus group discussion transcripts.
3.1.1 Case Studies
Qualitative case studies provided the cornerstone for this study. Case studies were
conducted with three former LRA members located in Gulu district. The aim of these
case studies was to delineate the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of each
former LRA member based on their unique personal experiences in the LRA. Case study
participants were selected based on their status as former LRA members, their
willingness to participate, and their fluency in English.
Throughout the case studies, the researcher aimed to develop a mutually trusting
relationship with each respondent. This ensured respondents’ comfort and led to
conversations that produced rich and insightful information on respondents’ experiences
in the LRA.
Each case study lasted two to three days per respondent. The researcher had an
initial meeting with the respondent to explain the study and develop a trusting
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relationship with the respondent. Following this initial meeting, each respondent was
interviewed two to three times, and each interview lasted approximately two hours.
Case study interviews were informal and semi-structured. Each interview was
conducted in a private location where the respondent felt comfortable to speak freely. A
questionnaire was initially used, but the conversations generally flowed naturally from
the first question, allowing the researcher to probe certain relevant topics. Interviews
were conducted entirely in English to ensure that no meaning or detail was lost in
translation. Written informed consent was obtained prior to each interview. All responses
remained confidential in order to ensure respondents’ safety as a vulnerable population.
3.1.2 Interviews
Qualitative formal interviews with opinion leaders in Gulu district and Kampala
allowed the researcher to access a diverse range of understandings of the complex
victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former LRA members. In total, twelve formal
interviews were conducted. Interview participants were selected based on their status as
local opinion leaders and their roles in post-conflict NGOs, transitional justice
mechanisms, local government, or religious institutions.
Formal interviews were semi-structured. The researcher used a basic
questionnaire, modifying questions based on the respondent’s unique experience.
Interviews were conducted in respondents’ offices or public gathering spaces. Interviews
were conducted entirely in English to reduce translation errors, and each interview lasted
30-60 minutes. Written informed consent was obtained prior to each interview.
Respondents’ names were used only with written permission.
3.1.3 Focus Group Discussions
Focus group discussions offered insight into local communities’ unique
understandings of the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former LRA
members. In total, five focus group discussions with four to six participants each were
conducted in Lukodi and Tyena Kaya, two villages in Gulu district affected directly by
the LRA conflict. These villages were selected based on their unique relationships to the
conflict. Lukodi was one of four sites where Dominic Ongwen was alleged to have
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committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in an attack on an IDP camp (“The
Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen,” 2016); the village was a target of ICC outreach and will
receive reparations if Ongwen loses the ICC case. On the contrary, Tyena Kaya had no
direct relationship to Ongwen, providing an important counter to any bias exhibited in
Lukodi.
Focus group discussions were qualitative, informal, and semi-structured. A
questionnaire was used; this questionnaire was modified based on the distinct experiences
of Lukodi and Tyena Kaya. Probing questions were utilized when participants brought up
new and relevant points. Focus group discussions were conducted in the communities
themselves, either in public gathering spaces such as schools or in personal compounds to
ensure that participants were comfortable to speak freely. In each community, focus
groups were comprised of entirely women, entirely men, or mixed. The purpose of such
composition was to gain access to a range of opinions and prevent gender hierarchies
from influencing responses. Focus group discussions were conducted in English and
Acholi through the use of a translator, allowing participants to speak in the language most
comfortable to them. Each focus group discussion lasted 30-60 minutes. Verbal informed
consent was obtained prior to each focus group discussion, and respondents remained
anonymous to protect their personal security and to allow them to speak freely on
sensitive issues.
3.1.4 Secondary Sources
A wide range of secondary sources was used to supplement data gathered in case
studies, interviews, and focus group discussions. Local opinion surveys produced by
NGOs offered a larger sample size of opinions on the complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood of former LRA members, including specific opinions on the case of
Dominic Ongwen. Reports and news stories produced by the ICC provided insight into
the ICC’s understandings of the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former
LRA members, specifically Ongwen himself. Scholarly articles on the LRA conflict and
the victim/perpetrator dichotomy, official legal documents, and human rights treaties
provided contextual information essential to understanding the complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood of former LRA members.
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3.2 Research Ethics and Limitations to the Study
3.2.1 Ethical Considerations
Due to the sensitive nature of this research topic and the use of vulnerable
populations, ethical considerations were given highest priority in the execution of this
study. In order to ensure that this study adhered to U.S. federal policy for the protection
of human subjects, the Local Review Board of SIT Study Abroad in Gulu, Uganda
reviewed the research proposal for ethical considerations. In addition, this study was
approved by the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology. In each case
study, interview, and focus group discussion, the researcher obtained informed consent.
Names of former LRA members and local community members were not used to ensure
the protection of these vulnerable populations. Names of opinion leaders were only used
with written permission.
The largest ethical concern arose with the use of former LRA members as case
studies. Due to stigma surrounding former LRA members, this population often refrains
from discussing its personal role in the LRA. As such, respondents were selected and
accessed using SIT and local community members as gateways. Additionally, although
the guns went silent in 2007, most Northern Ugandans consider the region to be in a
period of “relative peace” which could be disturbed at any time. As such, many former
LRA members remain fearful of speaking freely on sensitive subjects. Of particular
sensitivity are discussions of crimes committed by the respondent and the role of the
government in the LRA conflict. These discussions were treated with utmost
confidentiality in order to protect the personal security of former LRA members. Written
informed consent was obtained from each respondent, and voice recordings were only
used with the respondents’ written permission. Interview transcripts and voice recordings
remained anonymous and will be deleted upon completion of this research.
Lastly, many former LRA members and community members suffer from
posttraumatic stress disorder or other mental health issues. When the researcher
encountered traumatic recollections during case study interviews and focus group
discussions, such topics were approached slowly and sensitively. Prior to these
conversations, the researcher developed trust with the respondent and eased into each
interview with basic, non-triggering questions. Throughout each case study interview and
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focus group discussion, the researcher watched for signs of discomfort. Interview
questions were adjusted based on perceived comfort levels, and respondents understood
that they could terminate the interview at any point. Sometimes, the researcher terminated
the interview if the respondent exhibited indirect signs of discomfort.
3.2.2 Limitations to the Study
Although Northern Uganda is currently working towards reconciliation and
recovery, significant stigma still exists against former LRA members. As a result, the
most significant limitation to the study was accessing this vulnerable population. Despite
the researcher’s efforts to reach out to more former LRA members, only three were
willing to participate in case studies. This limitation was exacerbated by the necessity for
respondents to speak fluent English in order to reduce misunderstandings during the indepth case study interviews. Not only did this limit potential respondents, but it also
biased the sample. In Northern Uganda, fluency in English is generally a sign of
education; being more educated than many of their colleagues likely biased the responses
of the three former LRA members studied. This small, biased sample size was mitigated
by the inclusion of focus group discussion participants who were also former LRA
members. Although these participants were not studied in-depth, their limited insight
helps to widen the scope of this study. In sum, this study should not be viewed as a
representative sample of former LRA members. Rather, it should be viewed as an indepth depiction of three unique cases. While these cases can shed light on the experiences
of other former LRA members, they by no means represent the entire population.
Secondly, restricted access to ICC representatives limited this research. Despite
efforts to reach out to more representatives of the ICC, only one representative and one
intermediary were interviewed. To mitigate this limitation, the researcher interviewed
several key informants with extensive knowledge of the ICC.
Language barriers also limited the accuracy and depth of this study. Although
case study interviews were conducted with fluent English speakers, at times
misunderstandings occurred, hindering the flow of conversation and limiting the depth of
questions asked. These misunderstandings were mitigated through the use of clear, easily
interpreted questions. The use of a translator mitigated language barriers in focus group
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discussions, yet errors in translation still occurred; such errors were mitigated by
discussing the responses with the translator after the conclusion of the focus group
discussion. Time constraints also limited the researcher’s ability to conduct interviews
with all relevant opinion leaders in Gulu and Kampala. To mitigate this limitation, a
representative sample of opinion leaders was selected.
Lastly, due to the sensitive nature of topics discussed, some respondents may have
avoided giving honest answers in order to protect their security or self-esteem. When
discussing crimes committed by former LRA members, respondents may have altered
their responses, either due to embarrassment, self-protection, or even unconscious bias.
Findings are presented directly as respondents described, and thus must be taken as the
respondents’ understandings rather than concrete facts. Further, the researcher’s status as
a mzungu (white foreigner) could have inhibited respondents from offering completely
honest answers due to the power differential between the researcher and respondent. This
limitation was mitigated by developing trust with respondents and fully explaining the
extent and purpose of the study, in hopes of encouraging honest and accurate responses.
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Chapter 4: The Complex Victimhood and Perpetrator-hood of Former LRA Members
4.1 Understanding Former LRA Members
In order to deconstruct the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former
LRA members, findings from case studies of former LRA members are organized into
“factors of victimhood,” that is, factors of participation in the LRA that reveal
helplessness or unwillingness, and “factors of perpetrator-hood,” that is, factors of
participation in the LRA that reveal willingness or enthusiasm. As these factors are
delineated, it becomes clear that what may be considered a factor of victimhood also
possesses elements of perpetrator-hood, and vice-versa; the categories overlap, revealing
the impossibility of clearly sorting former LRA members into the social constructs of
“victim” and “perpetrator.” Aggregated, these factors demonstrate the complexity of
former LRA members.
4.1.1 Factors of Victimhood
Prior Disdain for LRA
Are they there to overthrow [the government], or are they there just to destroy the
community?
(Respondent 1, personal communication, October 25, 2016)
Prior to abduction, both abducted respondents reported preexisting negative
perceptions of the LRA. Despite his ambition to serve in an army and his existing distaste
for the Ugandan government, Respondent 1 disliked the disproportionately negative
effects of the LRA’s warfare on the community and questioned the LRA’s goals
(personal communication, October 25, 2016; personal communication, October 27,
2016). At age nine, Respondent 2 simply understood the LRA to be a negative force
(personal communication, October 25, 2016). Born in the bush, Respondent 3 had no preexisting feelings for the armed group (personal communication, October 29, 2016).
Respondents’ generalized negative feelings toward the LRA indicate that even if
they supported the fight against the Ugandan government, they remained unwilling to
support the LRA due to its reputation for atrocities. Their subsequent abduction into the
LRA was therefore against their will and ambition, contributing to their victimhood.
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Desensitization
There are no nightmares there… you see decomposing corpses, it is nothing.
(Respondent 1, personal communication, October 28, 2016)
Upon forceful conscription into the LRA, respondents reported various methods
of desensitization to “remove that civilian life from you” (Respondent 1, personal
communication, October 25, 2016). Designed to disorient new abductees, these initiation
rituals perpetuated fear and reinforced the importance of obedience (Schauer & Elbert,
2010, p. 321-322; Boothby, 2006, p. 248). Such methods ranged from carrying heavy
loots to witnessing – and even participating in – the murder of family members and kin.
Respondent 2 witnessed the murder of his uncle and entered into ambush within an hour
of his abduction at age nine (personal communication, October 26, 2016). He describes
his feelings at the time: “I was living like a person with an empty brain… it was like a
dream, because I couldn’t believe that I [was] with the killer” (personal communication,
October 25, 2016).
As their time in the LRA progressed, abducted respondents reported further
desensitization to atrocities. As described by Respondent 1, “The killings, very normal.
The looting, very normal. The ambushing, very normal” (personal communication,
October 25, 2016). While some respondents reported getting used to the trauma, others
disagreed: “I cannot say I’m getting used to it, no. I became resilient because there is no
choice” (Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25, 2016).
Whether former LRA members became accustomed to atrocities or simply
became resilient, the LRA’s initiation processes were designed to desensitize and
normalize the rebel group’s violent tactics (as cited in Hermenau, Hecker, Maedl,
Schauer, and Elbert, 2013, p. 2). Whereas LRA members may have previously been able
to distinguish right from wrong, the lines were blurred upon conscription into the LRA.
What once was appalling and inexcusable became commonplace.
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Brainwashing
Somebody had played with our intelligence…whereby you [had] forgotten who you are.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Beyond simply desensitizing new recruits, the LRA brainwashed its members to
support its ideologies. Thus, unwilling abductees were transformed into eager fighters.
Since most LRA members were children, brainwashing was even more effective
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 26, 2016).
Perhaps the purest example of brainwashing was exhibited by Respondent 3, who
was born and raised in the bush. Deprived from the reality of life outside the bush, she
assumed that when she grew up, she would become a soldier like her father: “That was
what I wanted…whereby I can hold a gun and shoot people” (personal communication,
October 29, 2016). When asked if she understood the difference between right and
wrong, she replied, “Actually, I was understanding the opposite. I was thinking that if
you beat, if you fight, if you kill, all those bad things – if you do that, you are doing the
right thing” (personal communication, November 1, 2016). By depriving the respondent
of access to the outside world, the LRA warped her moral compass; she was victimized
without her knowing.
The LRA had a more difficult job of brainwashing those it abducted, since
abductees possessed preexisting conceptions of right and wrong. One respondent
described spiritual brainwashing, a typical method of brainwashing in the LRA:
[Joseph Kony] comes, he sits, maybe under the tree, he talks maybe from morning
up to sunset, just telling stories… quoting things in the bible: ‘[The Israelites]
suffered for 40 years, then Moses came, saved them… so it’s me, Joseph Kony,
who’s going to save you from all the sufferings you’re experiencing… the only
thing you have to do is follow what is wanted here.’
(Respondent 1, personal communication, October 27, 2016)
Most brainwashing occurred during prayer time and was saturated with references
to the Holy Spirit (Respondent 2, personal communication, October 26, 2016). Many
LRA members believed that Kony was possessed with evil spirits that protected him and
allowed him to predict the future. Respondents recalled the fulfillment of Kony’s
prophecies, such as swarms of bees attacking the UPDF and soldiers being killed in battle
after disobeying one of Kony’s orders (Respondent 1, personal communication, October
27, 2016; Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25, 2016). These fulfilled
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prophecies reinforced belief in Kony’s spiritual powers and convinced LRA members
that obedience was the only option for survival:
I was imagining at least that there is something in him that sees ahead, so I should
at least believe in what he tells. Because if not, I see others also being killed, I see
others also being shot in the legs or the arms; then I say, okay, if I don’t follow
what he says, it will also happen to me.
(Respondent 1, personal communication, October 27, 2016)
Brainwashing also occurred on a tactical level. After battle, LRA commanders
congratulated members for their success. To children, this encouragement was
particularly influential:
You take also pride in something you do as a child…you feel like, okay, I am
being praised because of what I did… [It] will make you feel like you are part of
something. It will remove a little bit of fear. Because you say, okay, maybe they
have confidence in me. I am good in something.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25, 2016)
The LRA was able to brainwash its child members to believe in what they were
fighting for. Respondent 2, despite his previous negative impressions of the LRA,
explained, “I thought that by fighting and liberating, the entire country will become
peaceful and everyone will live a normal life” (personal communication, October 26,
2016). Kony and his commanders managed to convince their members that they were
committing atrocities in the name of peace.
By brainwashing its members to believe in its cause, the LRA moved beyond
physical force to psychological influence. Tactics of brainwashing forced young
members into a “confused state,” inhibiting their ability to distinguish right from wrong,
as Schauer and Elbert (2010) found in their examination of child soldiers (p. 330). Over
time, army commanders even became parental figures to vulnerable child soldiers,
making it far easier for commanders to brainwash young members (Schauer and Elbert,
2010, p. 319).
In describing how they each succumbed to the LRA’s brainwashing tactics,
respondents reveal that they were not just physically victimized, but also psychologically
victimized by the LRA. Lacking the moral cornerstone that comes with maturity, these
young LRA members were coerced to believe that what they were fighting for was right.
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While brainwashing contributed to the victimhood of former LRA members,
some were able to see beyond the brainwashing as they matured. After many years in the
LRA, one respondent began to doubt Kony’s word because what he predicted did not
always come true (Respondent 1, personal communication, October 28, 2016).
Respondent 1 demonstrated the complexity of a child who is a victim of brainwashing
eventually coming to understand that he has been victimized, yet remaining somewhat
helpless to the consequences of brainwashing.
Respondent 2, once himself a victim of brainwashing, rose in the ranks to
eventually perpetrate the same act. He explained that as a Lieutenant, he employed
brainwashing as a less violent tactic to retain new abductees:
I would also play around with people, like their psychologies, in order to keep the
person [in the LRA]. Like when somebody is abducted, in order to keep the
person, it doesn’t mean you have to be brutal all the time. You can politicize the
person, you can play around with the brain so that you can change him from his
position… to your position.
(Personal communication, October 27, 2016)
Although he had previously condemned brainwashing as a coercive tactic utilized
against him, here, Respondent 2 portrayed brainwashing in a more positive light – as a
way to reduce the need for violence against new recruits. The respondent’s contradictory
descriptions of brainwashing illustrate the complexity of his own status as both a victim
and perpetrator of the same act. It is possible that the brainwashing he experienced during
his early years in the LRA influenced his decision to brainwash others as a lieutenant;
perhaps he saw the act as harmless, or even beneficial, since he was made to believe that
he was working for a good cause.
Resignation and Obedience in the Face of Threat
If you refuse, they will kill you. So you will kill.
(Respondent 3, personal communication, November 1, 2016)
Common among all three respondents was the unwillingness to commit atrocities
that they were nevertheless forced or coerced to commit. Respondents attributed this
perceived lack of choice to the command structure of the LRA, which ultimately came
down to the will of Joseph Kony (Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25,
2016; Respondent 3, personal communication, November 1, 2016). Even the high
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command of the LRA remained under the command of Joseph Kony (Respondent 3,
personal communication, November 1, 2016); as a result, members had no choice in their
actions (Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25, 2016).
Coupled with their lack of power, LRA members faced constant threat from their
superiors. As described by Respondent 2, “You have to succeed. You fail? You are being
blamed. The blame that they bring on you will cost you either your life, or maybe it will
cause you a serious pain” (personal communication, October 25, 2016). Actions as
simple as questioning a superior’s commands or eating a forbidden food could result in a
beating or killing (Respondent 3, personal communication, November 1, 2016;
Respondent 2, personal communication October 25, 2016). Often, LRA commanders
would kill those who disobeyed to warn the others of the consequences of disobedience:
Those killings you see the LRA do, it’s mainly to instill that fear in the abductees,
… that when I don’t do what they want – I escape, I don’t carry luggages, I do
this – I will be killed like the person I’ve seen. So you follow all what they do.
(Respondent 1, personal communication, October 25, 2016)
In the face of this constant threat, “survival is first. It almost clears all the
thoughts, whether positive or negative…because you are trying to survive” (Respondent
2, personal communication, October 25, 2016). Consequently, many LRA members
resigned to unhappy obedience. They refrained from thinking about their actions, because
whether they liked it or not, they had no choice (Respondent 1, personal communication,
October 25, 2016).
Respondent 2 explained this humiliating lack of control:
After frustration after frustration, you resign yourself – you are like, let it be.
Because now you are hopeless… I see this person being killed… and because I
cannot stop it, I cannot do anything, I’ll just pretend like [it’s okay].
(Personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Respondent 1 echoed this sense of hopelessness and frustration:
I knew the war was not taking me anywhere. You were not even going to
overthrow any place, but instead people are going to lose their lives each day. I
knew. I knew. You see? I knew. But when you are there, what can you do?
Nothing. Nothing completely… You just keep quiet.
(Personal communication, October 25, 2016)
As LRA members resigned to obedience, they became accustomed to the
indiscriminate violence of the LRA; Respondent 1 went as far as to describe the LRA as a
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home (personal communication, October 25, 2016). Obedience became a ritual; violence
became the norm. Paralyzed by threat, LRA members perceived that they had no other
choice but to carry out violent orders. Some resisted “from inside,” but they could not
openly resist for fear of punishment. Others “tend[ed] to forget that [they were] now part
of the situation.” Respondent 2 explained that he likely would have done whatever the
LRA asked him to, because he “need[ed] to survive” (personal communication, October
26, 2016).
If LRA members excelled at following orders, they rose in the ranks. Yet even
with a higher rank, they still refrained from questioning Kony, since Kony killed many of
his senior fighters – even his second-in-command – for questioning him (Respondent 1,
personal communication, October 25, 2016). When asked why he did not oppose Kony as
a high-ranking officer, Respondent 2 responded:
The question is very simple but people don’t understand it. Your own life is not in
your hands. Somebody is controlling you. Whether you are the general, or you are
who[ever], there is somebody who is above you, which is Kony himself.
(Personal communication, October 25, 2016)
The responses of respondents indicate a lack of choice throughout their time in
the LRA, regardless of rank. Although in reality, LRA members may have had a choice
to either obey or disobey their superiors – perhaps in covert or subtle ways – members
perceived that the choice was a matter of life and death. Faced with constrained choices,
some LRA members chose to stand up against Kony and other superiors, but most
refrained for fear of punishment, a theme found also by Schauer and Elbert (2010, p.
319). Victims of threat and scare tactics, they were transformed into unwilling
perpetrators who committed crimes to save their own skin. Some chose to be martyrs,
sacrificing their lives for their morals. But the vast majority, victims of constrained
choices, succumbed to threat.
Forced Maturity
That’s when I realized maybe my life has changed completely… I am a child… but they
are not seeing that child in me.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 26, 2016)
The majority of LRA members were abducted as children (F. Odongyoo, personal
communication, October 31, 2016), yet the LRA’s tactics required high levels of
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maturity. As the Officer in Charge of a battalion of over 700 people, Respondent 2 had to
be “like their father,” with responsibilities that ranged from leading ambushes to
mediating conflicts between couples. The respondent explained that making such
“difficult and mature” decisions made him feel older than 17 (personal communication,
October 27, 2016).
Young girls took on unique responsibilities. As young as seven years old,
Respondent 3 often had to take care of her younger brother while her mother fought, a
responsibility she explains was “difficult” at such an early age (personal communication,
October 29, 2016).
Respondent 1 explained the effects of being forced to commit acts beyond his
years:
I was a different person from the very [person] I was when I was still outside…
because right now, I’m passing through very many things… I’m seeing killings…
in battlefields you do – you do kill. So I’m not now the real [self]; I’m a different
[self].
(Personal communication, October 25, 2016)
Respondent 2 agreed:
…When you bring [up] a child in this kind of hostile environment, and the other
child you have brought [up] in a very conditioned, good environment, there will
be two different personalities. This one who has grown up in the hard life, their
behavior will be also like the condition he has been in. The other will be soft like
the way he has been brought up.
(Personal communication, October 25, 2016)
Respondent 2 even considered himself lucky compared to those abducted at a
younger age than himself. According to the respondent, a young abductee can commit
atrocities “without any thought in his or her mind” (personal communication, October 26,
2016).
Child LRA members’ level of responsibility drew a sharp contrast with their level
of development. Children do not possess the moral reasoning and decision-making skills
of adults (as cited in Boyden, 2003, p. 350). Further, war environments can warp a child’s
moral compass (as cited in Boyden, 2003, p. 353). Children were forced to make
decisions that required a level of maturity and morality they did not always possess; their
questionable decisions often reflected this. Victims of forced maturity, they perpetrated
atrocities far beyond their years.
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Barriers to Escape
It was very difficult for me to put a thousand lives at risk for one, which is my life.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25, 2016)
Faced with the perceived choice between obedience and death, many LRA
members considered escape as an alternative. However, despite high rates of escape from
the LRA, respondents interviewed reported several mental and logistical barriers to
escape that trapped them in their positions in the LRA.
Any inclination of escape was discouraged by threats from LRA commanders.
Those who attempted to escape and were caught were killed brutally in front of the rest of
the group to set an example (Respondent 1, personal communication, October 27, 2016).
Further, the LRA would threaten to attack the villages and families of escapees; both
Respondents 1 and 2 cited this as the main reason they chose to stay for many years
(personal communication, October 25, 2016). These threats was not empty; according to
the Justice and Reconciliation Project (2008), the LRA massacred over 50 people in
Mucwini in 2002 as punishment for the escape of an abducted man (p. 7). Respondent 1
explained, “I would rather suffer [in the LRA] than put other people’s lives into danger”
(personal communication, October 25, 2016).
Even if LRA members decided they wanted to risk escape, they faced logistical
barriers. Often, other members would report those who tried to escape in order to gain
favor from their superiors. As such, escapees had to keep their plans secret (Respondent
1, personal communication, October 25, 2016). Even decorated officers were still
monitored from below for any sign of escape (Respondent 2, personal communication,
October 27, 2016). If a LRA member managed to escape, danger awaited outside the
bush. Respondent 1 explained his fear of “hostile tribes” or vengeful communities who
had suffered under the LRA (personal communication, October 25, 2016).
Eventually, all three respondents managed to escape the LRA; Respondent 2,
noting the difficulties of escape, cites his own escape as “just a miracle” (personal
communication, October 27, 2016). To the three respondents, these barriers to escape
were very real and frightening threats. Yet their ultimate success call into question the
legitimacy of these perceived barriers. One focus group respondent who spent a very
short time in the LRA before escaping called fear for the safety of one’s family a “lame
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excuse”; others agreed that those who stayed in the LRA were guilty simply for not
attempting escape (personal communication, November 13, 2016). Nevertheless,
respondents interviewed perceived threat if they attempted escape, and these threats were
enough to keep them in the LRA for many years. Threat coupled with the reality that
escape was often possible further complicates the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
former LRA members.
Personal Guilt
I feel sorry. I feel sorry. Because I have done – even if it was not my fault, I have done.
(Respondent 3, personal communication, November 1, 2016)
Despite articulating that they were forced to commit violence, respondents
reported feeling intense guilt for the atrocities they committed. After participating in an
attack that killed his clan brothers, Respondent 1 recalled, “It was so bad. So, so, so, so
bad” (personal communication, October 25, 2016).
Respondent 2 expressed regret toward his influence over those beneath him in the
ranks:
[I was] not knowing that I was empowering the wrong brain to go and loot, to go
and kill civilians there. I strengthened arms; I gave them knowledge… Through
me, many young ones who were taken got motivated… They [would] say, ‘I want
to be like him.’
(Personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Common among all three respondents were mixed feelings of responsibility and
innocence. Although they repeatedly articulated that they should not be held responsible
for acts they were forced to commit, they nevertheless expressed deep regret. Their guilt
reflects a pervasive aversion toward committing the atrocities that they committed,
contributing to their victimhood.
Challenging Authority
If you are ordered to do things and there is any way you can play around, you try to play.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 27, 2016)
In order to resolve the cognitive dissonance of being forced to commit unwilling
acts of atrocity, some LRA members boldly challenged authority. Only one of the three
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respondents interviewed reported ever challenging authority; the others reported that it
was too risky.
Respondent 2 subtly challenged authority in numerous ways, most often by
stalling to avoid carrying out particularly violent commands. Once, when ordered to kill
someone, he simply delayed; then, when there was a commotion, the man was able to
escape. Other times, he would think of alternative punishments to avoid murder (personal
communication, October 27, 2016). He even went as far as challenging Kony himself,
demanding to know why the LRA disregarded the Bible’s commandment not to kill.
Respondent 2’s ability to evade violent commands and even challenge Kony while
remaining alive and in Kony’s good favor was undoubtedly partly due to luck. However,
his successful protest reveals that depending on one’s status in the LRA, it was possible
to challenge authority. Baines (2009) confirmed this ability in her findings that some
children “play[ed] smart” or “play[ed] stupid” to manipulate their status in the LRA (p.
179). These testimonies illuminate the complexity of many former LRA members: while
they supported the ideological battle of the LRA, they also fought back against
unnecessary atrocity with the little power they retained.
4.1.2 Factors of Perpetrator-hood
Pride in the LRA
On the military side, [the responsibility] was exciting. I feel like – yes, this is what I am
supposed to be doing.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 27, 2016)
Even after describing their unwillingness to commit atrocities, Respondents 1 and
2 displayed pride in their roles in the LRA. Such pride typically surrounded promotions –
when asked how he felt about his promotion, Respondent 1 replied, “I cannot deceive you
– I was proud” (personal communication, October 25, 2016).
On the surface, pride contradicts respondents’ previously demonstrated
unwillingness to commit atrocities; if members opposed the LRA’s tactics, why would
they be proud of enforcing them? Easily influenced by praise from their superiors, these
child LRA members were eager to please, and happy when their hard work paid off
(Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 319). They failed to acknowledge that their promotion meant
the perpetration of more atrocities.
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Respondent 2 recalled a feeling of belonging within the LRA: “They were part of
me. They were just like my family now. Because we were sharing, experiencing the same
problem.” Despite his pride and attachment to the LRA, he stated that if the safety of his
family and himself were ensured, he would have left sooner (personal communication,
October 25, 2016). His mixed feelings reflect those of many former LRA members. After
spending years in the bush, members became attached to and proud of a group that they
once abhorred, yet still resented their participation.
Support for the Ideological Battle
Now I had the opportunity to revenge or pay back what I saw.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Both abducted respondents possessed negative feelings toward the Ugandan
Government prior to their forceful conscription into the LRA; these negative feelings
contributed to different levels of support for the LRA’s ideological battle against the
government. Growing up, Respondent 1 had “bad feelings” toward the government
because it cost his father his job; he felt that the Acholi tribe should take over the
Ugandan Government (personal communication, October 27, 2016). Similarly,
Respondent 2 indignantly recalled a cousin and other innocent people who had been
killed by the Ugandan government (personal communication, October 26, 2016). He
stated, “Despite the fact that willingly I would not have gone to the bush…it has given
me a reason why I should fight. I fought because of seeing all those kind of things”
(personal communication, October 26, 2016). In fact, the motivation of child soldiers is
commonly to “avenge” the death of a family member or “stand up” against a threat to
their family (Schauer and Elbert, 2010, p. 319).
Upon conscription, both abducted respondents were brainwashed; indeed, it is
difficult to distinguish their preexisting ideological support from what they were
brainwashed to believe. Nevertheless, the brainwashing likely contributed to their
preexisting negative feelings towards the Ugandan Government; according to Respondent
2, his preexisting negative feelings “help[ed] somebody who [was] brainwashing me to
brainwash me more.” He recalled that when given orders, he would flash back to when
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his cousin was killed and become motivated to carry out orders (personal communication,
October 26, 2016).
LRA members’ support of the rebel group’s ideology was magnified by their
childhood naivety. As described by Respondent 2, “I thought I was fighting for a
reason… [but] I didn’t know the magnitude of what I was fighting for, and I didn’t know
the motive of the person who started the battle” (personal communication, October 26,
2016). Many child LRA members threw their enthusiasm and support toward the LRA
for reasons they did not fully understand. The toxic combination of naivety,
brainwashing, and threat produced enthusiastic, even willing young fighters. These LRA
members perpetrated crimes willingly, confirming their perpetrator-hood. Yet at the same
time, part of this willingness stemmed from years of brainwashing and positive
reinforcement of negative behavior. Their clear ideological support for the LRA thus
further complicates their victimhood and perpetrator-hood.
Ambition
I thought that maybe after fighting, succeeding – then I’ll be somebody.
(Respondent 1, personal communication, October 27, 2016)
Some LRA members saw their abduction as not just a curse, but also an
opportunity. Of the three respondents interviewed, one in particular demonstrated
ambition during his time in the LRA. Respondent 1, pursuing his childhood dreams of
becoming a soldier, saw hope in the LRA’s fight. He fantasized that one day, if the LRA
seized power, he would be an army general in the new regime (personal communication,
October 28, 2016).
After escaping the LRA for the first time, Respondent 1 decided to return during
the Juba Peace Talks. If the peace talks were successful, Respondent 1 stated, “This could
be a chance of…continuing my studies, or a way of getting me into a new life” (personal
communication, October 27, 2016). Promised a diplomatic position in the LRA by a
high-ranking official, Respondent 1 capitalized on the opportunity to reach success,
despite the fact that he did not believe in the LRA. He explained, “I was only looking for
ways of survival” (personal communication, October 27, 2016).

VICTIMHOOD AND PERPETRATOR-HOOD IN N. UGANDA

41

While those who saw the LRA as a means to success may not have believed in the
LRA’s tactics, they capitalized on those tactics as a path to success, contributing to the
LRA’s violence in the process. Some may argue that they were simply making the best of
a difficult situation. Yet this ambition came at a steep price, calling their victimhood into
question.
Taking Initiative
As a human being, when you are young, you get overpowered sometimes by the wrong
decision.
(Respondent 2, personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Many LRA members moved beyond obedience to initiative. As they rose in the
ranks, Respondents 1 and 2 gained slightly more control over their decisions and learned
more about the inner workings of the LRA (Respondent 2, personal communication,
October 27, 2016). While for the most part, they followed the orders of their superiors,
Respondent 2 recalled times where he or other LRA members lost control. Once, he
recalled that he was so frustrated at the injustice of the LRA that if he had not been
disarmed, he would have shot someone. Homesickness and general trauma triggered such
losses of control in other LRA members, causing them to commit atrocities outside of
orders, such as killing civilians (personal communication, October 26, 2016).
Respondent 1 recalled “selfish” commanders who would steal money or conduct
ambushes outside of orders (personal communication, October 25, 2016). Most vividly,
Respondent 2 told the story of a LRA member who ordered people to be killed and
cooked in pots over frustration at losing a gun (personal communication, October 26,
2016).
These instances point immediately to the perpetrator-hood of LRA members.
Although they claim they were always forced to conduct atrocities, some conducted them
of their own will. The circumstances under which they committed these atrocities also
reflect aspects of victimhood. Violence and trauma can cause combatants – specifically
child soldiers – to act in ways they otherwise would not (Hermenau, Hecker, Maedl,
Schauer, and Elbert, 2013, p. 2). Once again, the complicated context and motivations of
LRA members’ decisions demonstrate that LRA members cannot be placed in polarized
categories of either “victim” or “perpetrator.”
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4.1.3 The Complex Reality
Disaggregating factors of victimhood and perpetrator-hood in former LRA
members illuminates a world of paradoxes. Former LRA members supported the group’s
ideology, yet were brainwashed to do so. They detested its violence, yet later felt pride in
their role in it. They took initiative to commit atrocities, yet this initiative was a response
to trauma. They felt guilt for their actions, but not responsibility.
When placed into context, these clashing factors of victimhood and perpetratorhood make sense. Former LRA members faced constrained choices in which perceived
threat forced them to choose most often between killing and being killed. Even if these
threats were sometimes empty, many former LRA members perceived them as real and
frightening. As a result, they committed actions that they otherwise would not.
Respondent 2 explains the paralysis of constrained choices:
I was like – should I commit suicide? Should I try to escape? … If you try to
escape, they will chase you – they will kill you. If you happen to kill somebody,
they will kill you. If you happen to kill yourself, you will die… I was just in the
middle somewhere.
(Personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Given limited options, it is unsurprising that so many former LRA chose to kill.
But does context make them victims? Or do they remain perpetrators by virtue of their
actions?
Attempting to sort former LRA members into groups of “victims” and
“perpetrators” is misguided, since most exhibit characteristics of both. Yet these
categories are constantly used to describe former LRA members. The next sections
explore how different groups understand the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
former LRA members, questioning why these complex characters are constantly forced
into the limiting boxes of “victim” and “perpetrator.”
4.2 Former LRA Members’ Constructions of Victimhood and Perpetrator-hood
Essential to conceptualizing constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood is
understanding how former LRA members construct themselves. Former LRA members
are the only ones who know all of the facts surrounding their complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood, and thus the only ones who can construct themselves accurately. At the
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same time, self-interest alters self-construction; therefore, LRA members’ selfconstructions must be analyzed with the distorting effects self-interest in mind (Stillwell
& Baumeister, 1997, p. 1158; Kearns & Finchman, 2005, p. 321). The following sections
examine how former LRA members construct their own victimhood and perpetrator-hood
and explore the various self-interested motivations behind these self-constructions.
4.2.1 Emphasis on Factors of Victimhood and Heroism
While all respondents conceded that they had committed crimes, each emphasized
the importance of the context of the crimes they committed (Respondent 2, personal
communication, October 25, 2016). According to respondents, when put into the context
of their abduction or birth in the bush, these crimes signified their victimhood more than
their perpetrator-hood. Respondents repeatedly emphasized factors of their victimhood
that led them to commit crimes, including their perceived lack of choice and fears that
disobedience meant death (Respondent 3, personal communication, November 1, 2016).
Respondent 3 emphasized her personal victimhood by distinguishing herself from
abductees. She explained that people who were abducted knew that “this place is not our
place. But for us, the people who were born from there [the bush], we just know that this
is our place.” Respondent 3 perceived herself as more of a victim than the average
abductee, due to her complete unawareness that her actions were wrong (personal
communication, November 1, 2016).
In addition to emphasizing their victimhood, respondents emphasized their heroic
acts. Respondent 1 described how he was friendly with other LRA members and
discouraged ideas of escape to protect his fellow LRA members from danger (personal
communication, October 28, 2016). Respondent 2 described himself as a “fighter with
integrity,” attempting to preserve the dignity of those with whom he fought (personal
communication, October 26, 2016). He explained how following his escape, he devoted
all of his time to an NGO working to end the conflict. In addition, he spoke on a radio
talk show encouraging people to come out of the bush (personal communication, October
27, 2016). All three respondents said that they consider themselves to be “different” than
others in the bush (Respondent 1, personal communication, October 25, 2016;
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Respondent 2, personal communication, October 25, 2016; Respondent 3, personal
communication, November 1, 2016).
Based on the above responses, former LRA members primarily constructed
themselves as victims. In spite of tangible factors of perpetrator-hood, such as
Respondent 1’s willing return to the bush, respondents felt that they had been victimized
and forced to commit atrocities against their will.
Former LRA members even prided themselves on heroic acts that in their minds
compensated for the atrocities they committed, paralleling the responses of former LRA
members compiled in “Victims, Perpetrators, or Heroes?” (2006, p. 14). Although it is
impossible to know if their recollections are accurate or distorted by self-interest, it is
clear that former LRA members understand themselves primarily to be victims of
circumstance who often overcame culpability through acts of heroism. Even Respondent
2, who articulated that he was not just a victim, never referred to himself directly as a
perpetrator. This understanding reveals a bias toward victimhood, perhaps due to denial
or self-protection in the aftermath of atrocity.
Upon further probing, respondents began to admit feelings of responsibility for
their actions, complicating their self-construction. The following section explores how
dual feelings of responsibility and helplessness contributed to a complex self-construction
that does not fit easily in the box of “victim” or “perpetrator.”
4.2.2 Feelings of Dual Responsibility and Helplessness
Although respondents placed a high degree of emphasis on factors of victimhood,
they still felt personally responsible for the crimes they committed, complicating their
self-construction as solely victims. Respondent 1 demonstrated these conflicting feelings:
There was nothing I could do, but also I felt that I would hold that responsibility
of all the atrocities being done… I was part of it. I was part of the blame… [but] it
wasn’t my choice.
(Personal communication, October 25, 2016)
All respondents demonstrated similar internal battles between feelings of
responsibility and helplessness. They each cited feelings of guilt upon their return and
realization of the gravity of the atrocities they had committed (Respondent 2, personal
communication, October 26, 2016). In particular, Respondent 3 described intense feelings
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of guilt after escaping the LRA and learning the difference between right and wrong,
something she had not understood from the time she was born in the LRA (personal
communication, November 1, 2016).
Such mixed feelings ultimately inhibited former LRA members from constructing
themselves as entirely victims or entirely perpetrators. Respondent 2 admitted that he did
not construct himself as a victim only, emphasizing that his circumstances did not
entirely excuse his actions (personal communication, October 27, 2016). All in all,
respondents showed a surprising willingness to admit responsibility or guilt for their own
actions. They were able to see the complexity of their own situations, realizing that they
could not place themselves neatly into the boxes of “victim” and “perpetrator.”
Yet despite their nuanced understanding of their own victimhood and perpetratorhood, respondents unanimously argued that they must not be held responsible for the
crimes they committed in the bush. As stated by Respondent 1:
Yes, I may feel guilty for what the LRA did, because I was there. But now when
you tell me that maybe if I’m to be held responsible for what had happened, how
would I take it? I may not accept it. Reason why? I didn’t join it.
(Personal communication, October 25, 2016)
This argument – particularly striking in Respondent 1, who did decide to rejoin to
the LRA at one point – echoed in all conversations with former LRA members.
Respondents’ recognition of their dual victimhood and perpetrator-hood only extended to
a point: their own security. While they admitted feelings of guilt, they refrained from
directly calling themselves perpetrators and thus incriminating themselves. Perhaps
recognition of victim/perpetrator complexity is only possible within a risk-free context;
as soon as the risk of punishment is introduced, self-interest kicks in, causing former
LRA members to return to constructing themselves as victims only.
4.2.3 Perspectives on Dominic Ongwen
Respondents were able to appreciate the complexity of Dominic Ongwen’s
victimhood and perpetrator-hood due to their similar experiences. In general, respondents
demonstrated sympathy for Ongwen, pointing out that he was forced to follow orders and
differentiating between Ongwen and other commanders who joined the LRA willingly
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(Respondent 3, personal communication, November 1, 2016). Respondent 1 explained
his sympathy for Ongwen’s situation:
You can imagine a child of that tender age experiencing that jungle sort of life,
that wild life. What kind of child do you expect that child to be, if it’s you? What
do you expect of that child? Would you expect that child to be a very humble
child?
(Personal communication, October 28, 2016)
Respondent 3 concurred, saying that she would have done the same in Ongwen’s
situation: “If I had not escaped from the bush, if I had grown up, I think I would have
done many bad things” (personal communication, November 1, 2016).
Respondent 2, on the other hand, did not sympathize with Ongwen. According to
him, Ongwen committed unnecessary atrocities; with his power as a commander, he
easily could have avoided committing so many atrocities. However, Respondent 2 did
understand that Dominic Ongwen was often forced to commit atrocities without a choice
in the matter (personal communication, October 27, 2016).
Here, respondents again showed a surprising willingness to appreciate the
complexities of Ongwen’s situation. Perhaps former LRA members could accurately and
fairly judge Ongwen because doing so posed no risk to their personal security. The
question remains whether Ongwen would construct himself with such nuance, or if he
would construct himself as entirely a victim out of self-interest and self-protection.
4.3 Local Constructions of Victimhood and Perpetrator-hood
While LRA members’ constructions of themselves are essential to understanding
their complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood, so too are the constructions of local
communities affected by the LRA’s atrocities. Local communities both suffered under the
LRA’s atrocities and lost their own children to abduction, complicating their
understanding of a group that both harmed them and was a part of them. Self-interest also
biased local constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood. During the conflict, local
communities had incentive to construct LRA members solely as victims because of the
widespread belief that amnesty for LRA members would lead to peace (Agger, 2012, p.
1). Now that the guns are silent, amnesty is no longer an incentive. Today, some
communities have stake in Dominic Ongwen’s ICC case, influencing their construction
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of former LRA members such as Ongwen primarily as perpetrators (Nyeko & Aloyocan,
2015, p. 5).
The following sections explore local communities’ deeply entrenched
constructions of former LRA members, with particular emphasis on the villages of
Lukodi and Tyena Kaya. Lukodi suffered directly under the alleged crimes of Dominic
Ongwen; today, the village is the site of concentrated ICC outreach leading up to
Ongwen’s trial. In addition, community members in Lukodi have been promised
reparations if Ongwen loses the ICC case, likely influencing their perspective on his
victimhood and perpetrator-hood (Nyeko & Aloyocan, 2015, p. 5). Community members
in Tyena Kaya, on the contrary, did not suffer under the crimes of Ongwen, but were
nevertheless directly affected by the LRA’s violence; their perspective provides an
important counter to the perspectives of Lukodi community members. Finally, the views
of local opinion leaders are examined to represent the views of the wider Northern
Ugandan community.
4.3.1 Local Definitions of Victims and Perpetrators
Definitions of “victims” and “perpetrators” among local communities revealed
significant insight into their constructions of the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
former LRA members. When asked to define “victims,” both the communities of Lukodi
and Tyena Kaya initially referenced those who suffered from the LRA’s atrocities.
Community members referenced themselves as victims of the LRA’s atrocities (personal
communication, November 13, 2016; personal communication, November 17, 2016).
Only one community member in Tyena Kaya proposed the idea that LRA abductees were
victims as well, forced to commit atrocities against their will (personal communication,
November 17, 2016). Community members’ views reveal an initial polarized
construction of “victims” as only people who suffered at the hands of the LRA; the idea
that LRA members could also be victims was seldom considered. Perhaps due to their
personal victimhood, community members were unable to perceive that others in
different situations could have also been victims. Or, perhaps resentment toward the LRA
blocked the possibility of LRA members as victims. Later, however, when the idea of
dual victim/perpetrators was suggested to community members, many accepted it.
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When asked to define “perpetrators,” respondents’ definitions were heavily
skewed toward LRA members. Perpetrators, according to community members,
intentionally committed violence against helpless victims to fulfill their own twisted
desires (personal communication, November 13, 2016). Without prompting, respondents
from both Lukodi and Tyena Kaya primarily defined perpetrators as LRA members
(personal communication, November 13, 2016; personal communication, November 17,
2016). Only one community member in Tyena Kaya suggested that perpetrators were not
restricted to the LRA, offering the example of thieves (personal communication,
November 17, 2016). The generalization of perpetrators as primarily LRA members
reveals significant polarization in constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood
among local communities. By constructing LRA members as perpetrators and only
perpetrators, community members initially failed to recognize any possibility of LRA
members’ victimhood. They framed the LRA conflict as “us against them.” The
community in Lukodi demonstrated even more polarized constructions than Tyena Kaya.
It is possible that heavy ICC outreach in Lukodi influenced community members to view
actors in the conflict as solely victims or solely perpetrators, since the framework of the
ICC’s retributive justice depends on such polarization (Fletcher, 2016, p. 302).
However, when asked if someone could be both a victim and a perpetrator, more
nuanced perspectives arose. Multiple respondents accepted the idea of a dual
victim/perpetrator, pointing out that the LRA forced its victims of abduction into acts of
atrocity, transforming them into perpetrators (personal communication, November 13,
2016). One respondent from Tyena Kaya rejected the idea that a person could be both a
victim and a perpetrator, but was quickly shut down by other participants in the focus
group (personal communication, November 17, 2016). This suggests the possibility of an
“official” community perspective; after years of interaction with NGOs promoting
reconciliation, it is possible that communities have adopted certain perspectives, and the
divergence from those perspectives is frowned upon (N. Opiyo, personal communication,
November 8, 2016).
Respondents had less sympathy for those who chose to remain in the LRA even
after offers of amnesty; these people “los[t] their victimhood status” by actively choosing
to remain (personal communication, November 13, 2016). Respondents from Lukodi said
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that although these LRA members may have faced threats to their families if they tried to
escape, this was a “lame excuse” for remaining in the LRA (personal communication,
November 13, 2016).
Socially constructing victims and perpetrators allowed community members to
distance themselves from the atrocities of LRA members (Mohamed, 2015, p. 1211).
However, when forced to think deeply about the issues, local community members in
both Lukodi and Tyena Kaya accept the complex reality of former LRA members. In the
case of local communities, self-interested social construction had its limits.
When the primary need for local communities was peace (“Forgotten Voices,”
2005, p. 25), community members tended to perceive former LRA members as victims
because this allowed for legal amnesty and the promise of peace (Baines, 2008, p. 10;
Agger, 2012, p. 1). Now, community members generally offer nuanced perspectives on
the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of LRA members. Perhaps now that Northern
Uganda is peaceful, community members are able to view LRA members through a more
realistic lens.
4.3.2 Local Perceptions of Particular Actors in the LRA
To further explore their constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
former LRA members, respondents were probed on their perceptions of those who were
born in the bush and those who volunteered to join the LRA. Of particular controversy
was the status of those who were born in the bush. Both local communities were divided
on the status of these actors. Some respondents immediately emphasized that these LRA
members were solely victims since their existence in the bush was no fault of their own
(personal communication, November 13, 2016). Many respondents, however, stressed
that those born in the bush were perpetrators of the highest level because they know
nothing beyond a life of violence (personal communication, November 17, 2016). One
respondent even suggested the idea of inherited sin, stating, “Just as a mzungu [foreign]
mother and father cannot produce an African child, neither can a rebel mother and father
produce a child who is a victim” (personal communication, November 13, 2016).
Community members in Tyena Kaya cited examples of children who were born in the
bush and returned to the community: one boy cut his brother with a panga, while a girl
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killed her father by pounding his head, stating that this was how they did things in the
LRA (personal communication, November 17, 2016). Incidents like these led many
community members to believe that such children could not be corrected from lives of
violence, and thus were perpetrators.
In this case, the social construction of the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of
those born in the LRA was evident. Respondents saw these actors as either solely victims
or solely perpetrators; no middle ground or consensus was reached within the focus
groups. Although many members of the focus groups had lost their children to abduction
and considered their children victims, they were unwilling to consider children born in
the LRA as victims. Perhaps this reflects another instance of self-interested social
construction of victims and perpetrators – participants were willing to consider the
complexity of their own children, but unwilling to consider the complexity of others who
were born in the bush.
Many community members also perceived those who volunteered for the LRA
primarily as perpetrators who joined the rebels to satisfy their violent desires or acquire
arms (personal communication, November 13, 2016; personal communication, November
17, 2016). Some respondents in both Lukodi and Tyena Kaya offered a different view.
They pointed out that various circumstances could have influenced people to willingly
join the LRA. These reasons included family problems, poverty, unemployment,
propaganda from the government, and more. According to these respondents, these
people are not perpetrators – they were “seduced” to join the LRA. Their actions remain
criminal, but they personally are not perpetrators (personal communication, November
13, 2016; personal communication, November 17, 2016).
Nuanced views on LRA volunteers reveal an even deeper understanding among
local communities of the complexity of actors in the LRA. Here, despite the temptation to
construct these actors entirely as perpetrators, local communities were able to see beyond
their heinous atrocities to empathize with their situation.
Local constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood are multifaceted. Gulu’s
LC5 Chairman Martin Mapenduzi attempted to explain the perspectives of local
communities based on their experiences:
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If somebody came to you and abducted your children, even if those children
became the worst killers, in your heart you know they were abducted, they were
taken forcefully from you. So you know these children were good children until
they were trained and turned into something else.
(Personal communication, October 26, 2016)
Evidently, this empathy extended to LRA volunteers, although it stopped at those
born in the bush. Having experienced the complexity of the conflict firsthand, community
members constructed victimhood and perpetrator-hood with equal complexity, influenced
at times by self-interest.
4.3.3 Local Perceptions of Dominic Ongwen
Dominic Ongwen’s victim/perpetrator status elicited the most controversy among
community members. Those in Lukodi, the village that suffered directly under Dominic
Ongwen’s alleged atrocities, constructed Ongwen entirely as a perpetrator. They accused
Ongwen of coming from a violent tribe, and utilizing his position in the LRA to cause
havoc. Only one respondent from Lukodi viewed Ongwen as both a victim of abduction
and a perpetrator of conflict (personal communication, November 13, 2016). Conversely,
residents from Tyena Kaya were able to construct Ongwen more intricately as someone
who was captured and threatened against his will, yet also worked actively for
promotions in the LRA. Respondents expressed anger that Ongwen did not choose to
surrender under the Amnesty Act (personal communication, November 17, 2016; Nyeko
& Aloyocan, 2015, p. 2). Yet overall, they were able to appreciate the complexities of his
situation rather than focusing solely on his perpetrator-hood.
The significant differences in constructions of Dominic Ongwen’s victimhood
and perpetrator-hood likely reflect each community’s unique relationship to Dominic
Ongwen. As direct targets of Ongwen’s alleged crimes, community members in Lukodi
were unable to see past his status as a perpetrator since this is all they have ever known
him to be. Further, community members in Lukodi were promised reparations if Dominic
Ongwen loses the ICC case, causing them to see Ongwen as more of a perpetrator than he
actually is (A. Owor, personal communication, October 27, 2016). Tyena Kaya, on the
contrary, demonstrated a more balanced view of Ongwen’s victimhood and perpetratorhood. Without any personal stake in the Ongwen case, community members in Tyena
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Kaya were able to perceive his complexity uninhibited by self-interested social
construction.
4.3.4 Views of Local Opinion Leaders
Aggregated, local opinion leaders’ constructions of victimhood and perpetratorhood tended to be more polarized than those of the local communities themselves. The
majority of opinion leaders interviewed emphasized the victimhood of former LRA
members, presenting a variety of arguments that differed greatly from local communities’
arguments. Many opinion leaders stressed the failure of the community, government, and
international community to protect children from abduction (Bishop Onweng, personal
communication, October 28, 2016; F. Odongyoo, personal communication, October 31,
2016; N. Opiyo, personal communication, November 8, 2016). In a report by the Refugee
Law Project in which the feedback from a dialogue with 61 opinion leaders in Northern
Uganda was compiled, the majority of participants believed Ongwen was a victim
because the government failed to protect him (Odong, 2015, p. 4). Bishop Onweng
expressed his frustration with justice mechanisms that fail to recognize this important
point: “Why don’t we arrest the Acholi people? Why don’t we arrest the government of
Uganda? Why don’t we arrest the world?” (Bishop Onweng, personal communication,
October 28, 2016). A failure of society to protect former LRA members was also
reflected Vaha’s 2008 study, which emphasized how this failure contributed to LRA
members’ victimhood (p. 13).
Other local opinion leaders condemned LRA members as perpetrators only.
According to Ambrose Olaa, the Acholi Prime Minister, the ability to distinguish right
and wrong is an “automatic element” even among those in the LRA. He constructed LRA
members as perpetrators only, due to their choice to commit atrocities despite the
knowledge that they were wrong (personal communication, November 2, 2016). This
perception of choice was a common theme among those who constructed former LRA
members as perpetrators. Pamela Angwech of GWED-G, a local NGO, condemned
Dominic Ongwen for committing crimes despite his autonomy as a commander (personal
communication, October 31, 2016).
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The wide gap between opinion leaders who constructed former LRA members as
victims versus perpetrators reveals a disconnect between opinion leaders and the
communities whose opinions they claim to represent. While many community members
were willing to consider, and even accept the idea of a dual victim/perpetrator, most
opinion leaders stood firmly on one side or the other. Their polarized constructions of
victims and perpetrators generally aligned with the mission of their organizations.
Constructing a former LRA member as a victim was advantageous to many NGOs,
because it legitimized a mission of advocacy and reconciliation (N. Opiyo, personal
communication, November 8, 2016). Conversely, constructing a former LRA member as
a perpetrator necessitated legal punishment and reparations (Fletcher, 2016, p. 302).
Regardless, neither self-interested construction aligned with the often-nuanced
perspectives of community members.
Few opinion leaders offered a nuanced perspective on the victimhood and
perpetrator-hood of former LRA abductees. Those who did emphasized the context of the
crimes that were committed, particularly that the actions of those in the LRA were
“outside their consent” (I. Okwir, personal communication, October 31, 2016). Nicholas
Opiyo, the human rights lawyer defending Thomas Kwoyelo, a former LRA member
facing charges before Uganda’s International Crimes Division, advocated for a
“diminished responsibility” due to the circumstances of abduction and forced retention in
the LRA (N. Opiyo, personal communication, November 8, 2016). Those opinion leaders
with complex constructions of the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of LRA members
tended to be leaders of research or law organizations; the high level of detail with which
they studied the LRA conflict likely contributed to their unique perspectives.
4.4 ICC Constructions of Victimhood and Perpetrator-hood
Beyond those directly affected by the Northern Ugandan conflict, institutions
such as the ICC form their own constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood. In
light of Dominic Ongwen’s impending ICC trial, it is imperative to understand how the
Court constructs the complex victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former LRA members.
Although the ICC strives to be fair and impartial in every case (Bensouda, 2015), its very
nature as a brand of retributive justice influences how it constructs victimhood and
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perpetrator-hood. The following sections explore how the ICC constructs victimhood and
perpetrator-hood in Northern Uganda, particularly relating to the Ongwen case.
4.4.1 Retributive Justice and the Construction of “Victims” and “Perpetrators"
In general, opinion leaders in Gulu and Kampala accused “Western” methods of
retributive justice such as the ICC of constructing “victims” and “perpetrators” to their
own benefit. According to researcher Arthur Owor, the victim/perpetrator concept is, “not
so much a concept that comes from below,” but rather, phraseology popularized by
NGOs, scholars, and the ICC (A. Owor, personal communication, October 27, 2016). In
prosecution, “you are either guilty or not guilty. You are either a perpetrator or a
victim… there is no room to look at your complicated status” (Intermediary to the ICC,
personal communication, November 10, 2016). By constructing victims and perpetrators
as dichotomous, retributive justice mechanisms such as the ICC legitimize the need for
punishment of perpetrators, thus validating their own purpose (Fletcher, 2016, p. 302).
Such accusations against the ICC mirror those against Rwanda’s gacaca courts. By
criminalizing all Hutus, the gacaca courts legitimized their method of justice at the
expense of accuracy (Begley, 2016, p. 16).
This accusation contradicts the goal of retributive justice to offer fair trials to all.
By granting the right to representation to both sides of a trial, methods of retributive
justice attempt to level the playing field for the accused and victims, offering each a
chance to defend themselves (J. Otim, personal communication, November 7, 2016).
Despite its foundation in fair and impartial trials, however, the ICC lacks support among
opinion leaders in Gulu district due to perceptions of its bias against Dominic Ongwen.
Opinion leaders accused the ICC’s retributive justice of constructing Dominic
Ongwen as a perpetrator. According to the Justice and Reconciliation Project (2008):
To date, justice interventions in Uganda reify the idea that Ongwen is a heinous
perpetrator, and reproduce the idea that responsibility for this war can be placed in
the hands of a few individuals often characterized as mad.
(p. 4)
Some community members were dissatisfied with the ICC’s ability to understand
the complexity of the Ongwen’s case. They felt that Acholi traditional justice
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mechanisms such as Mato oput more accurately contextualize Ongwen’s crimes. Acholi
Prime Minister Ambrose Olaa stated:
Going beyond conventional definitions [of victim and perpetrator] is very
important for us to deal with complex cases like the one of Dominic Ongwen. I
don’t think the ICC can go to that level. It may end at the conventional definition
[of perpetrator]. But then it betrays…the position of the people, the other people
like the Acholi people – their beliefs, their values, their understanding – which
may not necessarily be wrong.
(A. Olaa, personal communication, November 2, 2016)
Some accused the ICC of constructing victims and perpetrators to maintain its
legitimacy. In the face of recent withdrawals of African states from the ICC, it is
imperative that the Ongwen case improves the ICC’s reputation, according to Jackson
Odong of Refugee Law Project. He called the Ongwen case “a test” of justice
mechanisms (personal communication, November 2, 2016). A popular idea circulating in
Northern Uganda is that the ICC and Ongwen are both under trial. Instead of striving to
understand the complexity of Ongwen’s case, Human Rights Focus director Francis
Odongyoo accused the ICC of simply trying to “justify” its indictments by constructing
Ongwen as a perpetrator (personal communication, October 31, 2016). An intermediary
to the ICC revealed that constructing Ongwen as a perpetrator helps to fulfill the ICC’s
mission and justify the money it has spent on the case. He acknowledged, “It really
benefits the ICC to see that Dominic Ongwen is convicted – it’s points for them; it’s
marks for them” (personal communication, November 10, 2016).
These condemnations of the ICC have significant implications for the Ongwen
case itself. In questioning the legitimacy of the ICC’s motivations for constructing
victims and perpetrators, opinion leaders simultaneously questioned the legitimacy of the
case itself. When the ICC issued its arrest warrant for Ongwen in 2005, it was facing a
similar legitimacy crisis as a brand new court. It is possible that the indictment itself was
a method of maintaining legitimacy; now that Ongwen has been arrested and accused, the
ICC must continue to maintain its legitimacy by constructing him as a perpetrator.
Others, such as LC5 Chairman Martin Mapenduzi, saw this Ongwen case as a
chance for the ICC to conduct a clean, fair trial to improve its reputation: “To the best of
my knowledge, the ICC is doing everything they can… to have a fair outcome” (personal
communication, October 26, 2016). The Prosecutor of the ICC reinforced this statement
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with a promise to Ongwen’s family that Ongwen will be, “subjected to a fair and
impartial judicial process of the highest international standards” (Bensouda, 2015).
Indeed, despite concerns surrounding the ICC’s perceptions of Ongwen, many
community leaders expressed faith in the justice system’s ability to fairly try Ongwen. As
ICC Outreach Coordinator Jimmy Otim pointed out, “He is innocent until proven
guilty… The case is up for the judges to decide” (personal communication, November 7,
2016). Indeed, the ICC’s public statements indicate that the Court is taking every possible
step to ensure an impartial trial for Ongwen – a trial that reveals both his victimhood and
perpetrator-hood (Bensouda, 2015). The very fundamental goal of retributive justice is to
fairly and represent both the accused and the victims through the right to representation.
All the same, LC5 Chairman Mapenduzi admitted that a loss for the Prosecution would
“send a demoralizing message to the ICC” (personal communication, October 26, 2016).
Overall, the ICC has significant incentives to construct Dominic Ongwen as a
perpetrator. Its public statements reveal an impartial and unbiased perception of Dominic
Ongwen, and its foundation in retributive justice reveals a desire for fair trials. Yet many
local opinion leaders fear that the ICC fundamentally cannot avoid constructing Ongwen
as a perpetrator. Based on earlier demonstrations of Ongwen’s complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood, such constructions would defy accuracy. The follow sections explore
how the ICC constructs Ongwen, both from its own perspective and the perspective of
local opinion leaders.
4.4.2 The ICC Investigation: Early Constructions of Perpetrator-hood
In describing the ICC’s investigations in Northern Uganda, ICC Outreach
Coordinator Jimmy Otim explained, “They looked for what happened, they listened to the
people that suffered the crimes, they did a thorough investigation. It is from investigation
that names started emerging.” The ICC then issued arrest warrants for those who were
“most responsible for crimes” (J. Otim, personal communication, November 7, 2016).
While most Northern Ugandans agree that Dominic Ongwen was responsible for many
atrocities, many feel that the ICC’s investigation did not do justice to the circumstances
that led to Ongwen’s crimes (F. Odongyoo, personal communication, October 31, 2016).
Human rights lawyer Nicholas Opiyo explained:
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The ICC doesn’t look at the internal complexities of Northern Uganda and is
primarily just concerned with that macro, legal-political viewpoint that they have.
And they completely cannot understand the local dynamics in Uganda, the
complexities, the social, cultural, and local dynamics that have informed this war.
(Personal communication, November 8, 2016)
Failure to understand the complexities of Northern Uganda led to a failure to
appreciate Ongwen’s victimhood during investigation; according to Bishop Onweng, the
ICC could not fundamentally understand the impact of abduction on a child (personal
communication, October 28, 2016). An intermediary to the ICC explained that during
investigations, the ICC only considered Ongwen’s perpetrator-hood; it was not until the
confirmation of charges hearing when Ongwen said he had also been abducted by the
LRA that his victimhood as an abductee was truly recognized (personal communication,
November 10, 2016).
The ICC compounded on its failure to recognize Ongwen’s victimhood by
announcing that it would only try crimes Ongwen committed above the age of eighteen.
According to the Rome Statute, children under the age of eighteen cannot be tried
(“Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 2002, art. 26). Jimmy Otim of the
ICC explained that this article of the Rome Statute was designed to protect children from
unfair prosecution. Yet many others believe that the ICC is ignoring the significance of
Ongwen’s childhood experiences, including abduction and indoctrination in the LRA. As
explained by Francis Odongyoo of Human Rights Focus:
Adulthood is a progression, from childhood to that. It is not something that is just
– poof! – there you are. He was formed by being a child to become an adult. By
focusing on him and ignoring the victim aspect…[the ICC is] ready to close their
eyes to that fact [of his abduction].
(Personal communication, October 31, 2016)
Justice and Reconciliation Project’s Isaac Okwir echoes:
Should you listen to the counts on Dominic Ongwen, that is a clear indication that
they are only looking at what Dominic Ongwen did. But they have never
mentioned what happened to Dominic Ongwen… they are only looking at
Dominic Ongwen through one angle, as a perpetrator. They only want to prove
that he is a criminal, a perpetrator.
(Personal communication, October 31, 2016)
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In response to these criticisms, the ICC emphasized that Ongwen’s childhood
victimhood can be used as mitigation (J. Otim, personal communication, November 7,
2016; H. Kilama Komakech, personal communication, October 30, 2016).
The ICC’s Outreach team, in an effort to portray the case in an unbiased way, has
demonstrated its knowledge of the case’s complexity in a variety of outreach initiatives in
local communities. Yet it is “struggling with how to deal with [the complexity]… They
pretend to acknowledge his victimhood, but only as a minor thing” (J. Odong, personal
communication, November 2, 2016). As the ICC’s outreach team has attempted to
explain the case to local communities, it appears to have indirectly constructed Ongwen
as a perpetrator. Without full understanding of legal mechanisms, many community
members generally assume that he is automatically guilty of these crimes (I. Okwir,
personal communication, October 31, 2016). LC5 Chairman Mapenduzi explained, “The
moment you indict – the moment the indictment comes out, you are actually a suspect – a
major suspect… So that does not make him appear as not yet guilty” (O.M. Mapenduzi,
personal communication, October 26, 2016).
As put bluntly by a community member in Lukodi, “For him, the case is not fair,
but it is fair to us” (personal communication, November 13, 2016). In the ICC’s attempt
to establish a fair, unbiased case, it indirectly constructed Ongwen as a perpetrator and
disregarded his victimhood as a former LRA member. As a retributive justice
mechanism, the ICC needed a perpetrator to legitimize itself; it found one in Dominic
Ongwen. By trying only crimes he had committed above the age of eighteen, it protects
Ongwen from punishment for the crimes he committed as a child; yet at the same time, it
effectively disregards the context of his childhood abduction.
Despite the ICC’s construction of Ongwen as a perpetrator, his case is not entirely
delegitimized. Ongwen still has the right to his own attorney, who will undoubtedly
highlight the factors of victimhood that contextualize Ongwen’s actions. In addition, he
ICC will take every step to ensure that his trial is impartial and evenhanded (Bensouda,
2005). Yet its goal of impartiality is undermined by its polarized construction of Ongwen.
Whether intentional or unintentional, the ICC’s construction of Ongwen as a
perpetrator has repercussions beyond Northern Uganda. According to Bishop Onweng,
“The western world looks at him as a criminal… because of the ICC. Because the ICC is
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the agent of the world” (personal communication, October 28, 2016). The implications of
the biased construction of Ongwen’s perpetrator-hood matter not only for his case at the
ICC, but also for an accurate understanding of the LRA conflict and achievement of
justice for complex victim/perpetrators.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
Trying to fit former LRA members into the boxes of “victim” and “perpetrator” is
not only futile, but also obscures reality. As LRA members have demonstrated time and
again, their motivations – even their very personalities – were warped by the situations of
constrained choice and indoctrination in which they found themselves. Deep examination
of the “willingness” with which LRA members perpetrated atrocities reveals a culture of
fear and threat in the LRA. Failure to recognize members’ dual aspects of victimhood and
perpetrator-hood is a failure to appreciate the complexity of the conflict in Northern
Uganda.
However, constructions of victimhood and perpetrator-hood are useful. They
simplify the incomprehensible; they distance us from the reality that we, too, could have
faced similar situations as former LRA members and made the same decisions. LRA
members constructed themselves primarily as victims when faced with the risk of
punishment, but in risk-free environments acknowledged their complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood. Local community members also recognized this complexity, but at
times were swayed by self-interest. The ICC constructed former LRA members as
perpetrators to legitimize its method of retributive justice in the most concerning case of
self-interested social construction.
Yet as local people and former LRA members themselves have demonstrated, it
remains possible to transcend the social constructions of “victim” and “perpetrator” in
favor of a more nuanced perspective. In doing so, they embraced the idea of a conflict
that is more complex than meets the eye. They recognized the humanity in the most
heinous of acts.
As stated by Mazinani (2014), “conflicts are viewed as a primordial and
unsolvable animosity” (p. 290). Yet when the context of conflict is examined in detail,
what once was incomprehensible begins to make more sense. As we look back on the
Northern Ugandan conflict, we can sort actors into boxes of “victims” and “perpetrators,”
punish the perpetrators, and move on. Or, we can look deeper, striving to understand the
contextual factors that transformed ordinary civilians into agents of atrocity. In doing so,
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we recognize the suffering and humanity of both sides of conflict. We extend our
empathy toward those who suffered both conventionally and unconventionally. And most
importantly, we move toward preventing the same contextual recipe for violence in the
future.
5.2 Recommendations
5.2.1 International Criminal Court
The ICC failed to recognize Dominic Ongwen’s complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood at the time when it was most important – its investigation of Northern
Uganda. Since the investigation has concluded and Ongwen has been indicted, the ICC
must now take steps to ensure a balanced portrayal of Ongwen’s complex victimhood and
perpetrator-hood. Most importantly, the ICC must objectively acknowledge Dominic
Ongwen’s factors of victimhood and perpetrator-hood in all outreach initiatives and
public statements to encourage a nuanced view of Ongwen in Northern Uganda and the
international community.
Moving forward, the ICC must publicly acknowledge the existence of actors with
ambiguous victim/perpetrator status. In doing so, it will set an example for all methods of
transitional justice. Further, the ICC must develop an effective framework for achieving
justice for these ambiguous actors through either its own method of retributive justice or
by supporting alternative methods of restorative justice.
5.2.2 Government of Uganda
In order to conclusively delineate the complexity of the Northern Ugandan
conflict and clarify the ambiguous status of former LRA members, the Government of
Uganda must fulfill its promise to conduct a national truth commission. By bringing the
hidden details of the conflict to the surface, the government can debunk the constructions
of “victim” and “perpetrator” in favor of a nuanced perspective. In order to legitimize this
process, the government must simultaneously acknowledge its own role in the Northern
Ugandan conflict.
Lastly, the Government of Uganda must engage in and promote dialogue that
contextualizes rather than polarizes the victimhood and perpetrator-hood of former LRA
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members. The government has the power to set an example for the rest of the country; by
engaging in nuanced dialogue, it will encourage the rest of the country to examine the
LRA conflict with similar nuance.
5.2.3 Opinion Leaders
This research demonstrated a gap between opinion leaders and communities
themselves on perspectives of victimhood and perpetrator-hood. This indicates that
opinion leaders must actively engage with communities to understand and accurately
represent their perspectives on victimhood and perpetrator-hood in the Northern Ugandan
conflict.
Opinion leaders must also promote nuanced and contextualized dialogue
surrounding victims and perpetrators of the Northern Ugandan conflict. This dialogue
should be emphasized particularly in locations of frequent ICC outreach, where
community members have been influenced by the ICC’s need to construct victims and
perpetrators.
Lastly, opinion leaders must refrain from constructing victims and perpetrators to
legitimize the missions of their particular organizations. Instead, they must employ
accurate and contextualized narratives and develop the goals of their organizations based
on these narratives.
5.2.4 Future Researchers
The most critical and urgent goal of future researchers must be to coin a term to
describe those with ambiguous victim/perpetrator status. Without a term to describe
these actors, their complex status is delegitimized and polarized. With the coining of
this term, future researchers must discourage the use of the polarized constructs of
victim and perpetrator in academia, instead advocating for a more nuanced and accurate
description of conflict.
Future research must probe deeply into the contextual factors that enabled the
Northern Ugandan conflict and other similarly complex conflicts. In the process, they
must develop a working list of cross-cutting contextual factors that motivate or force
those with complex victim/perpetrator status to commit atrocity. By identifying

VICTIMHOOD AND PERPETRATOR-HOOD IN N. UGANDA

63

common contexts that may lead ordinary people to commit atrocities, researchers will
highlight the humanity of perpetrators of conflict and move toward more practical
theories of conflict prevention.
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Appendix 1: List of Anonymous Case Studies of Former LRA Members
Respondent

Interview Dates

Gender

Age

Years in
LRA
9

Final Rank

42

Age at
Abduction
16

1

October 25, 2016
October 27, 2016
October 28, 2016

Male

2

October 25, 2016
October 26, 2016
October 27, 2016

Male

34

9

8

Captain
(3 Stars)

3

October 29, 2016
November 1,
2016

Female

25

Born in
LRA

13

No rank

Captain
(3 stars)
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Appendix 2: List of Formal Interviews with Community Leaders
Name
Ojara Martin
Mapenduzi

Interview Date
October 26, 2016

Title
LC5 Chairman of Gulu District

Arthur Owor

October 27, 2016

Independent Researcher

Bishop Onweng

October 28, 2016

Catholic Bishop

Henry Kilama
Komakech

October 30, 2016

Human Rights Lawyer

Francis Odongyoo

October 31, 2016

Director of Human Rights
Focus

Pamela Angwech

October 31, 2016

Director of GWED-G

Isaac Okwir

October 31, 2016

Representative of Justice and
Reconciliation Project

Ambrose Olaa

November 2, 2016

Acholi Prime Minister

Jackson Odong

November 2, 2016

Representative of Refugee Law
Project

Jimmy Otim

November 7, 2016

Uganda Outreach Coordinator
for the ICC

Nicholas Opiyo

November 8, 2016

Human Rights Lawyer, Lawyer
for Thomas Kwoyelo

Anonymous

November 10, 2016

Intermediary to the ICC
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Appendix 3: List of Focus Group Discussions with Local Community Members
Community
Lukodi

Date of Focus Group Discussion
November 13, 2016

Focus Group Makeup
Women (6)

Lukodi

November 13, 2016

Mixed (6)

Lukodi

November 13, 2016

Men (4)

Tyena Kaya

November 17, 2016

Women (6)

Tyena Kaya

November 17, 2016

Mixed (5)
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Appendix 4: Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire
1. What does the word “perpetrator” mean to you?
2. What does the word “victim” mean to you?
3. Can someone be a “victim” and a “perpetrator” at the same time?
4. Is someone who was born in the LRA a victim or perpetrator?
5. Is someone who volunteered to join the LRA a victim or a perpetrator?
6. Is someone like Dominic Ongwen, who was abducted but rose in the ranks, a
victim or a perpetrator?
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